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 Introduction by Professor Sir John Beddington 
Computer based trading has transformed how our financial markets operate. 
The volume of financial products traded through computer automated trading 
taking place at high speed and with little human involvement has increased 
dramatically in the past few years. For example, today, over one third of 
United Kingdom equity trading volume is generated through high frequency 
automated computer trading while in the US this figure is closer to three-
quarters.  
Whilst the prevalence of computer based trading is not disputed, there are 
diverse views on the risks and benefits which it brings today, and how these 
could develop in the future. Gaining a better understanding of these issues is 
critical as they affect the health of the financial services sector and the wider 
economies this serves. The increasingly rapid changes in financial markets 
mean that foresight is vital if a resilient regulatory framework is to be put in 
place. A key aim of this Foresight project, which has been overseen by a 
group of leading experts, has therefore been to draw upon the very best 
science and evidence from across the world to take an independent look at 
these issues.  
The three papers presented here review evidence directly commissioned by 
the project as well as the wider evidence base. Leading experts from over 20 
countries have been involved in writing and peer reviewing this material. The 
first paper considers the effect of computer trading on financial stability. It 
reviews the evidence of its past effect, and considers possible future risks. In 
contrast, the second paper considers the benefits that computer trading has 
had on liquidity, price efficiency and transaction costs. Together these two 
papers paint a picture of both risks and benefits, and for this reason neither 
paper should be read in isolation. The third paper focuses on technology. 
Importantly, the results documented here represent the independent views of 
academics. In particular, this working paper does not represent the position 
of the UK or any other government, nor does it seek to further the interests 
of any part of the financial services sector. However, whilst these papers are 
not presented as the last word on the topics they address, I hope that they 
can make a substantial contribution to current debate. It is on this basis that I 
take great pleasure in making them freely available. 
 
Professor Sir John Beddington CMG, FRS 
Chief Scientific Adviser to HM Government and 
Head of the Government Office for Science 
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 Paper 1: Financial stability and 
computer based trading 
Jean-Pierre Zigrand, London School of Economics, 
Dave Cliff, University of Bristol, 
Terrence Hendershott, University of California at Berkeley. 
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 Key findings 
Economic research thus far provides no direct evidence that high frequency 
computer based trading has increased volatility.  
However, in specific circumstances, a key type of mechanism can lead to 
significant instability in financial markets with computer based trading (CBT): 
self-reinforcing feedback loops (the effect of a small change looping back on 
itself and triggering a bigger change, which again loops back and so on) 
within well-intentioned management and control processes can amplify 
internal risks and lead to undesired interactions and outcomes. 
The feedback loops can involve risk-management systems, and can be 
driven by changes in market volume or volatility, by market news, and by 
delays in distributing reference data.  
A second cause of instability is social: a process known as normalisation of 
deviance, where unexpected and risky events come to be seen as ever more 
normal (e.g. extremely rapid crashes), until a disaster occurs. 
- 7 - 
 
 Executive summary 
This paper reviews the findings of the “driver review” documents 
commissioned by the Foresight project, and other recent literature, that 
explore the effects of computer based trading (CBT) on the stability of 
financial markets both now and in the future.  
We concentrate here on stability as a primary factor affecting confidence in 
capital markets, including their role as a wealth store or as a borrowing 
vehicle. Changes and fluctuations in market values are always to be 
expected, but if a change is sufficiently large or unexpected that it 
fundamentally impairs the saving/investment process, eroding confidence, 
then that change can be considered as a financial stability event.  
For example, despite being an intra-day event, the “Flash Crash” of 6 May 
2010 (when the US equity market dropped by 600 points in 5 minutes, 
eliminating approximately US$800bn of value, and then regained almost all 
of the losses within 30 minutes) helped to erode confidence in stock markets 
sufficiently to be followed by several months of outflows from retail mutual 
funds in the US.  
We identify three main mechanisms that may lead to instability when 
financial markets involve significant proportions of CBT: nonlinear 
sensitivities to change (where small changes can have very big effects), 
incomplete information (where some agents in the market have more, or 
more accurate, knowledge than others), and internal “endogenous” risks 
based on feedback loops within the system.  
The internal chains of cause and effect that are central to endogenous risks 
in CBT-markets involve positive feedback loops that can amplify and self-
reinforce detrimental interactions between different aspects of well-
intentioned management and control processes. 
The feedback loops can even be worsened by risk-management systems, 
and can be driven by changes in market volume or volatility, by market 
news, and by delays in distributing reference data.  
A fourth cause of instability is social: a process known as normalisation of 
deviance, where unexpected and risky events come to be seen as ever more 
normal, until a disaster occurs. 
Finally, in a world with multiple trading and pricing venues that are 
interconnected by CBT systems, the network topology determines the 
stability and the flow of information and trades, and hence is a major factor in 
determining overall systemic stability. 
The novel aspects of the dynamics of markets with significant proportions of 
computer based high frequency traders include: (a) that interactions are 
taking place at a pace where human intervention could not prevent them – 
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 an important speed limit has been breached; (b) that, given this, computer 
based (and therefore mechanical) trading is almost obligatory, with all of the 
system-wide uncertainties that this gives rise to; (c) that information 
asymmetries then become more acute (and indeed different in nature) than 
in the past; and (d) that the source of liquidity provision has changed, to 
computer based and high-frequency trading, which has implications for its 
robustness under stress. 
1. Introduction  
We take a broad interpretation of Computer Based Trading (CBT). A useful 
taxonomy of CBT was proposed in DR51, which identifies three 
characteristics that can be used to classify CBT systems. First, CBT systems 
can trade on an agency basis (i.e. attempting to get the best possible 
execution of trades on behalf of clients) or a proprietary basis (i.e. trading 
using one’s own capital); second, CBT systems may adopt liquidity-
consuming (aggressive) or liquidity-supplying (passive) trading styles; and 
third, they may be classified as engaging in either uninformed or informed 
trading. Much of the current public debate is concerned with the class of 
aggressive predatory algorithms, especially those that operate at high speed 
and with high frequency. Because most financial institutions that operate 
CBT cannot be neatly assigned to only one of the above buckets, it is more 
fruitful to think about CBT systems, the algorithms they employ directly, and 
the frequency at which they trade, rather than to think about the behaviour of 
a particular named financial or trading corporation such as a specific 
investment bank or fund-management company. For much the same 
reasons, in the discussion that follows we will not focus on any one asset 
class (such as equities, foreign exchange, commodities, or government 
bonds) in particular, but rather we will spell out the forces that seem likely to 
shape the future stability issues arising from CBT. In this report we 
summarise the intuition behind some of the more economically plausible risk 
factors of CBT: these “risk drivers” can best be viewed as forming the logical 
basis of possible future scenarios concerning the stability of the financial 
markets. 
2. How has CBT affected financial stability in the past?  
The raison d'être for financial markets is to aggregate myriad individual 
decisions and to facilitate an efficient allocation of resources in both primary 
and secondary markets2 by enabling timely and reliable reaping of mutual 
gains from trade, as well as by allowing investors to diversify their holdings. 
                                            
1 Throughout this document DR refers to driver review studies commissioned by the lead expert group. These can 
be found in the project's webpage: http://bis.gov.uk/foresight/our‐work/projects/current‐projects/computer‐
trading  
2 When a company issues equities (shares) to raise capital, that is the primary market in action. When the shares 
are then subsequently traded among investors and speculators, that is the secondary market in action.  
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 As with many other aspects of modern life, innovations in technology and in 
finance allow the repetitive and numerically intensive tasks to be increasingly 
automated and delegated to computers. Automation, and the resulting gains 
in efficiency and time, can lead to benefits but also to social costs. This 
paper focuses solely on possible repercussions of CBT on financial stability, 
especially the risks of instability. This should certainly not be construed as 
meaning that CBT is socially detrimental or bears only downside risks and 
costs. The hope is that by better understanding the risk-drivers of CBT on 
financial stability the creators, users and regulators of CBT systems may be 
able to manage the risks and allow the benefits of CBT to emerge while 
reducing the social costs. 
The findings in this paper may apply to any given market structure, but we 
feel they are especially relevant to the continuous auctions of the sort that 
run on traders’ screens in most of the major financial markets worldwide. 
The reason is that even if daily volume is large, the second-by-second 
volume may not be. For instance, even a daily turnover of more than $4trn in 
the foreign exchange market on average corresponds to only $2.7m second-
by-second volume for major currency pairs like Euro-USDollar. Even in such 
a huge market, a sufficiently large order can temporarily sway prices, 
depending on how many other orders are in the market (the “depth” of the 
market) at that moment in time.  
Price volatility is a fundamental measure useful in characterising financial 
stability (wildly volatile prices are an indicator of instabilities in the market) 3. 
In DR1, Linton and Atak note that, since the turmoil of 2008/2009, in the UK 
equities market fundamental volatility has decreased, and liquidity and 
trading volume have slowly returned. If high-frequency trading (HFT) 
contributes to volatility, Linton and Atak argue, it might be expected that the 
ratio of intraday volatility to overnight volatility would have increased as HFT 
became more commonplace, but Linton and Atak do not find evidence to 
support that hypothesis. They note that the frequency of large intraday price 
moves was high during the crisis period, but since the end of 2009 the 
frequency has declined to more normal levels.  
CBT and HFT are relatively new phenomena so the empirical literature 
examining their role is still nascent. Research thus far provides no direct 
evidence that HFT has increased volatility.4 Significant challenges in 
evaluating HFT are that much of its growth coincides with the 2008/2009 
turmoil and the lack of data fully characterising HFT.5 Indirect studies of CBT 
                                            
3 Stability can differ from volatility by placing significantly greater weight on large, infrequent price changes.  
4 See DR 12, Brogaard, J. (2011), High Frequency Trading and Its Impact on Market Quality, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1641387; Chaboud, A., Chiquoine, B., Hjalmarsson, E., & Vega, C. (2009), Rise of the 
Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501135; & 
Hasbrouck, J., & Saar, G. (2011), Low‐Latency Trading, Working paper, Cornell University.  
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 and HFT provide interesting evidence highlighting the importance of further 
study with better data, but are subject to various interpretations.6 
It is something of a cliché to say that CBT can lead to “Black Swan” events, 
i.e. events that are extremely rare but of very high consequence when they 
do occur. Of course, a more computerised world is more vulnerable to some 
types of catastrophic events, such as power failures, major solar emissions, 
cyber-attacks and “outages” of server computers; any one or more of these 
could in principle lead to system-wide failure events.  
However, as far as financial stability is concerned, the more interesting and 
significant aspects have to do with the general nonlinear dynamics of the 
financial system. Put simply, the dynamics of a system (how it changes over 
time) are nonlinear if a given change in one variable may either lead to a 
small change in another variable or to a large change in that other variable, 
depending on the current level of the first variable. Nonlinear systems can 
sometimes exhibit very large changes in behaviour as a result of very small 
alterations of key parameters or variables, and in some cases they are 
“complex” systems, for which it is impossible to predict the long-term 
behaviour because an observer can never know the relevant key values with 
sufficient accuracy. Furthermore, because economic systems are composed 
of “agents” (individuals, firms, regulators, etc) that interact in various ways, 
the particular structure of the network of interactions can have a very 
significant effect on the dynamics of the system too.7 Currently the scientific 
literature on complex nonlinear dynamics of networked systems is (in 
comparison to other fields) in its infancy with regards to concrete predictions 
and reliably generalisable statements, but can be put on a solid modelling 
footing by integrating with the foundations of the financial economics 
literature: this can offer glimpses of important insights, and we rely on those 
in this report. 
Market crashes have been around forever: Zweig, 20118 relates the story of 
a “Flash-Crash” type event in 1962, which the US Securities and Exchange 
                                                                                                                           
5 Jovanovic, B., & Menkveld, A. (2011) Middlemen in Limit‐Order Markets, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501135, 
have a comparison of the volatility of Dutch and Belgian stocks before and after the entry of one HFT firm in 
the Dutch stocks and find that the relatively volatility of Dutch stocks declines slightly.  
6 For example, Zhang, F. (2010), High‐Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discovery, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691679 , proxies for HFT with a measure of daily trading volume not associated with 
changes in quarterly institutional holdings. Zhang finds an association between this trading volume measure 
and “excess” volatility. While the proxy likely relates to CBT, the correlation is difficult to interpret as arising 
from HFT because the volume‐volatility relation appears well before the adoption of HFT as currently defined. 
Finally, a stronger relation between volume and volatility can result from increased welfare enhancing investor 
risk sharing. Therefore, indirect studies of HFT and CBT such as this are not recommended as a basis for policy 
options. 
 
7 See DR6, DR7 & Haldane, A. & May, R. (2011), Systemic risk in banking ecosystems, Nature 469:351‐355.  
8 Zweig, J. (2010), Back to the future: Lessons from the forgotten ‘flash crash’ of 1962. The Wall Street Journal, 
May 29, 2010. http://online.wsj.com/ article/SB10001424052748703957604575272791511469272.html; 
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 Commission analysed in a report published in 19639. Nevertheless, the 
problem of understanding mechanisms that underlie system-level events in 
CBT environments is more recent. A good illustration for the sort of systemic 
events that mechanical rule-following is able to generate can be found in the 
portfolio-insurance-led market decline of 198710. In order to hedge their 
risks, as stock indices dropped, portfolio insurers were required to adjust
their ’delta-hedge’ a holding of stocks used to balance risk. However, the 
values of the stocks in the delta-hedge holdings were used to calculate the 
value of the index. So, as the delta-hedge was adjusted because the ind
had dropped, stocks were sold, the selling depressed prices, and that 
pushed the index even lower; this then caused another adjustment of the 
delta-hedge holdings, which pushed the index even lower still. This positiv
feedback loop (the effects of a small change looping back on themse
and triggering a bigger change, which again loops back, and so on) ha
profoundly damaging effect, leading to major share sell-offs. This loop is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Such destructive feedback loops can generate 
nonlinear dynamics and can operate until delta-hedges no longer need to be 
adjusted or until a market halt is called. The mechanical and unthinking 
execution of such “program trades” led in 1987 to huge selling pressure and 
to price falls much deeper than were warranted by actual market conditions. 
 
ex 
e 
lves 
d a 
  
Figure 1: Hedge Feedback Loop 
The discrepancy between market prices and true values of securities (given 
by the fundamental value of the company or resource) when the former are 
depressed by forced sales in a nonlinear, self-fulfilling and sometimes self-
exciting frenzy constitutes a major market instability which comes at a 
substantial social cost. It might be argued that the more trading decisions are 
taken by “robot” CBT systems, the higher the risk of such wild feedback 
loops occurring within a financial system. This “endogenous risk” is the 
logical thread that runs through much of the rest of this paper. The 
endogenous risk from human programmed algorithms may differ in important 
ways from feedback loops and risks in markets with greater direct human 
involvement. 
 
                                            
9 US Securities and Exchange Commission (1963), Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, Chapter 13, 
available from: 
http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1960/1963_SSMkt_Chapter_13_1.pdf.  
10 See DR9, and also Gennotte, G. & Leland, H. (1990). Market liquidity, hedging, and crashes. American 
Economic Review, 80:999–1021. 
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3. How is CBT thought to affect financial stability?  
3.1 Mechanisms of instability  
It seems unlikely that the future of CBT in the financial markets leads merely 
to a faster system, and therefore to more frequent crashes and crises, purely 
on the (metaphorical) basis that the same old movie is now being played at 
fast-forward speed. Rather, it seems more likely that despite all its benefits, 
CBT may lead to a qualitatively different and more obviously nonlinear 
financial system in which crises and critical events are more likely to occur in 
the first place, even in the absence of larger or more frequent external 
fundamental shocks. Here some of the insights into what the precise 
mechanisms could be are outlined. 
Three main mechanisms that can lead to instability and losses can be 
summarised as follows:  
 Sensitivity: systemic instability can occur if a CBT environment becomes 
more sensitive to small changes or perturbations. If financial dynamics in 
a CBT world become sufficiently nonlinear so that widely different 
outcomes can result from only small changes to one or more current 
variables (the so-called “butterfly effect” in chaotic dynamics), then the 
observed prices and quantities are prone to cascades, contagions, 
instability and path-dependency.11 The mechanisms of deviation may be 
the information sensitivity mechanisms, and/or the internal feedback 
loops, both of which are discussed further below. Even if the effects were 
temporary and the original driving variables were to revert to their long-
term average values over time, some further irreversible events may have 
occurred, such as financial losses or even bankruptcies due to forced 
sales or to the triggering of penalty clauses in contracts. 
 Information: the existence of excessive nonlinear sensitivities can be due 
to informational issues. Informally, this is concerned with who knows what, 
when. The information structure of a market has the potential to 
exacerbate or reduce market swings through a number of subtle, and 
sometimes contradictory, effects. To illustrate this, academic studies have 
explored behaviour that arises in coordination games with diffuse 
information12. In these game scenarios, information is diffuse and agents 
coordinate to create a ’bank-run‘ on an institution, a security or a currency 
if a given publicly observed signal is bad enough. Only very small 
differences in the signal, say the number of write-offs of a bank, determine 
                                            
11 See DR7 and also Haldane and May (2011) op. cit.  
12 See, for example: Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E. (1993), Global Games and Equilibrium Selection. 
Econometrica, 61:989‐1018. And also Morris, S. & Shin, H. (2002), Global Games: Theory and Applications. In 
Dewatripont, L. & Turnovsky, S., (eds), Advances in Economics and Econometrics, the Eighth World Congress. 
Cambridge Uni. Press. 
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 whether creditors run or stay. Violent cascades of failures over an entire 
market system can be triggered by such small events. 
 Endogenous risk: this term, commonplace in the financial literature13 
identifies features wholly within the financial markets that lead in some 
situations to the sudden (due to the nonlinearities involved) emergence of 
positive (i.e. mutually reinforcing) and pernicious feedback loops, whether 
market participants are fully rational or otherwise14 15.  
In the discussion that follows, a number of feedback loops that can 
contribute to endogenous risk are explored.  
Risk feedback loop. Financial crises typically involve endogenous risk of 
the following sort. Assume that some financial institutions are hit by a loss 
that forces them to lower the risk they hold on their books. In order to reduce 
risk, they need to sell risky securities. Since many institutions hold similar 
securities, the sale of those assets depresses prices further. When 
institutions are required to practice “mark-to-market accounting” (where the 
value of some holding of securities is based on the current market price of 
those securities), the new lower valuations lead to a further hit to bank 
capital for all institutions holding the relevant securities, and also to a further 
increment in general perceived risk. Those two factors in turn force financial 
institutions to shed yet more of their risks, which in turn depresses prices 
even further, and so forth. A small initial fundamental shock can lead to 
disproportionate forced sales and value-destruction because of the 
amplifying feedback loops hard-wired into the fabric of financial markets.16 
Versions of this loop apply to HFT market makers: given the tight position 
and risk limits HFT operate under, losses and an increase in risk lead them 
to reduce their inventories, thereby depressing prices, creating further losses 
and risk, closing the loop. The value-destruction in turn can lead banks to 
stop performing their intermediation role with adverse spillover effects on the 
real economy. 
                                            
13 See: Danielsson, J. and Shin, H. (2003). Endogenous Risk in Modern Risk Management: A History. Risk Books; 
Danielsson, J., Shin, H. S., and Zigrand, J.‐P. (2010). Balance sheet capacity and endogenous risk. Mimeo, 
www.riskresearch.org; and Shin, H. (2010). Risk and Liquidity: 2008 Clarendon Lectures in Finance. Oxford. 
14 See DR2, DR6, DR7, and DR9. 
15 See also M. O’Hara (1995), Market Microstructure Theory. Blackwell Publishers. 
16 For further details see Brunnermeier, M. & Pedersen, L. (2009), Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, 
Review of Financial Studies, 22:2201‐2238. For empirical evidence on the effect of losses or redemptions see 
Joshua, C. & Stafford, E. (2007), Asset Fire Sales (and Purchases) in Equity Markets, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 86:479‐512. For evidence on how shocks can propagate across different financial institutions see 
Khandani, A. & Lo, A. (2007), What Happened To the Quants in August 2007? Journal of Investment 
Management 5:29‐78 and Khandani, A. & Lo, A. (2011), What Happened To the Quants In August 2007? 
Evidence from Factors and Transactions Data, Journal of Financial Markets 14:1‐46. 
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 Volume feedback loop. Whether the official CFTC/SEC report17 version of 
the “Flash Crash” events of 6 May 2010 turns out to be accurate and 
complete or not (see DR4 and DR7 for further discussion), it does illustrate a 
potential driver of risk. The report outlines a possible scenario whereby some 
high frequency trader (HFT) algorithms may directly create feedback effects 
via their tendency to hold small positions for short time periods: a “hot-
potato” or “pass-the-parcel” dynamic occurred on May 6 where trading 
amongst HFTs generated very large volumes but the overall net position 
hardly changed at all: financial instruments were circulating rapidly within the 
system, and this increase in volume triggered other algorithms which were 
instructed to sell more aggressively in higher volume markets, presumably 
on the basis that higher volume means lower market impact, to sell into the 
falling market, closing the loop18.  
 
Figure 2: Risk Feedback Loop Figure 3: Volume Feedback Loop 
Shallowness feedback loop. Closely related is the potential feedback loop 
described by Angel (1994)19 and Zovko and Farmer (2002)20. Assume an 
initial increase in volatility, perhaps due to news. The distribution of bids and 
asks in the order book adjusts and becomes more dispersed. 21 With 
everything else constant, incoming market orders (i.e., orders to buy or sell 
at the market’s current best available price) are more able to move the 
market reference price (based on the most-recent transaction price), and this 
                                            
17 CFTC & SEC (2010). Findings regarding the market events of May 6, 2010. Official report published September 
30, 2010 by the Commodities & Futures Trading Commission and the Securities & Exchange Commission. 
18 Kirilenko, A., Kyle, A., Samadi, M. & Tuzun, T. (2011). The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading 
on an Electronic Market, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1686004 provide evidence that some market participants 
very rapidly bought and sold from each other with small changes in position over very short horizons during the 
Flash Crash. While this is a case study of only one (index) security over a few trading days, it highlights the 
importance of better understanding certain CBT and HFT strategies and their interactions with each other and 
other market participants. While not able to directly indentify CBT or HFT, Easley et al. provide evidence the 
speed and magnitude of unusual trading behaviour in more securities during the Flash Crash: see Easley, D., 
Lopez de Prado, M. & O'Hara, M. (2011). The Microstructure of the ‘Flash Crash’: Flow Toxicity, Liquidity 
Crashes and the Probability of Informed Trading. The Journal of Portfolio Management, 37: 118‐128 
19 Angel, J. (1994). Limit versus market orders. Working Paper, Georgetown University.  
20 Zovko, I. & Farmer, D. (2002). The power of patience: a behavioral regularity in limit‐order placement. 
Quantitative Finance, 2(5):387‐392.  
21 For an examination of these types of book changes prior to news about earnings see Lee, C. , Mucklow, B., & 
Ready, M., (1993). Spreads, depths, and the impact of earnings information: an intraday analysis. Review of 
Financial Studies, 6:345‐374.  
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 increase in volatility in turn feeds back into yet more dispersed quotes, and 
the loop is closed.  
News feedback loop. Many automated HFT systems work primarily on 
numeric information from market data sources concerning prices and 
volumes of market orders, but some HFT systems include a news listener 
component that scans headlines for tags and acts upon them immediately by 
broadcasting the tag to all other components of the HFT system (news 
analytics, the computerised analysis of text-based news and online 
discussions to generate CBT trading systems, is discussed in greater detail 
in DR8). HFTs buy or sell depending on where prices are relative to the 
HFT's own perceived fair value; if the transactions of HFT systems are 
reported in news feeds, and picked up on by other HFT systems, that can 
lead those systems to revise their price in a direction that encourages them 
(or other HFTs) to make similar trades. 
 . Figure 4: Shallowness Feedback Loop Figure 5: News Feedback Loop 
Delay feedback loop. Eric Hunsader of Nanex Corp. suggests22 the 
potential of the following very simplified feedback loop that may have 
operated during the Flash Crash. Consider a fragmented market suffering 
from overall selling pressure of a basket of high-capitalisation stocks (e.g. 
originating from the sales of E-Mini futures), and assume that the NYSE 
quotes lag by a bit. Since the market is falling, the delayed NYSE bids 
appear to be the most attractive to sellers, and all sales are routed to NYSE, 
regardless of the fact that actual bids were lower. Algorithmic momentum 
HFTs short those stocks and given the oddness, HFTs may sell inventories. 
A second feedback loop then reinforces the first one: as delays creep in and 
grow, the increased flurry of activity arising from the previous feedback loop 
can cause further misalignments in bid/ask time stamps, closing the delay 
feedback loop which is amplifying the pricing feedback loop.23  
Index feedback loop. The CFTC/SEC final report on the Flash Crash 
argued that the extreme volatility of the individual component securities 
spilled over into the ETF (exchange-traded fund) markets and led market 
                                            
22 See DR7 and also: Hunsader, E. (2010). Analysis of the flash crash, date of event: 20100506, complete text. 
Nanex Corp., http://www.nanex.net/20100506/FlashCrashAnalysis CompleteText.html. 
23 Consistent with delay feedback loops having stronger effects in securities where trading is spread across 
more markets, Madhavan (2011) finds that across stocks, the impact of the Flash Crash is positively related to 
measures of fragmentation in the month before: Madhavan, A. (2011), Exchange‐Traded Funds, Market 
Structure and the Flash Crash, Working Paper, BlackRock, Inc.  
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 makers to pause their market making activities. In return, the illiquid and stub 
ETF prices for aggregates provide false systematic factor signals, feeding 
back into the pricing of individual securities, and thereby closing the loop.24  
 
Figure 6: Quote‐Delay Feedback Loop Figure 7: Index Feedback Loop 
3.2 Interactions between mechanisms  
The strength of the feedback loops is tied in with and driven by various 
variables, especially the capitalisation levels and the leverage ratios of 
financial institutions as well as the degree of diversity of market participants. 
For instance, if liquidity is provided by lightly capitalised HFT operators as 
opposed to deep-pocketed market-makers with large inventories,25 then the 
passing-of-the-parcel as well as the resulting feedback loops are stronger 
because inventory management with little capital requires the quick 
offloading of positions. In that sense at least, substituting speed for capital 
works well for market-making purposes in normal times but may not work 
well in more stressed times where the lack of capital can extremely quickly 
contribute towards positive instead of negative feedback loops.26 Similarly, 
the less diversity that market participants show, the more in unison they act 
and so the stronger the feedback loops. Moreover, diversity itself can 
change for the worse during an episode of endogenous risk as an 
unintended consequence of the combined interactions of risk-management 
systems, regulatory constraints, margin calls and mark-to-market accounting 
requirements, which can lead to instantaneous synchronisation of actions 
among a group of institutions if they are all subject to the same regulations, 
constraints, and coordination devices. For instance, the CFTC and SEC 
found that during the crucial minutes of the Flash Crash, liquidity providers 
switched to becoming liquidity demanders and sold aggressively and in an 
unsophisticated fashion into a falling market once their inventories reached a 
certain level. In a situation where liquidity provision is in the hands of a small 
                                            
24 Madhavan (2011) op. cit. analyses the feedback loop between ETFs and the underlying securities during the 
Flash Crash. 
25 For empirical evidence on the importance of liquidity providers balance sheets see Comerton‐Forde, C., 
Hendershott, T., Jones, C., Moulton, P., & Seasholes, M. (2010) Time Variation in Liquidity: The Role of Market 
Maker Inventories and Revenues. Journal of Finance, 65:295‐331. 
26 For further details on how intermediaries manage risk and how this affects price dynamics see Duffie, D. 
(2010), Presidential Address: Asset Price Dynamics with Slow‐Moving Capital, Journal of Finance, 65:1237‐1267. 
For empirical measures of the magnitude see Hendershott, T. & Menkveld, A. (2011), Price Pressures. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411943.  
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 number of large but slightly capitalised players, this can lead to a dry-up of 
liquidity when a small number of these large players switch liquidity provision 
off (see also DR7 for an estimate of the strength of this effect). In fact 
informational asymmetries (where one player knows that they know less 
than another) have the power to strengthen the other two mechanisms in a 
variety of ways (for more details, see DR9). This is because investors may 
mistake a temporary forced sale for a sale based on negative inside 
information, leading to lower prices still. 
Similarly, in CBT environments it appears to be much easier for predatory 
investors to accumulate positions anonymously than it was in times past 
when all traders interacted physically on the floor of an exchange, partly due 
to the fact that only anonymous quotes in a limit order book are observed as 
opposed to a physical person buying contracts in a central pit, and partly due 
to the ease of using “unlit” or “dark pool” venues where trades are only 
reported after they have happened. If such players were able to push prices 
purposefully into cascades, they might be able to generate profitable trades, 
giving them an incentive to create instability. While such situations can be 
conceived, access to the data required to establish how easy it is to launch a 
cascade or indeed how common is this style of predatory behaviour is 
difficult, assuming it exists at all. 
Furthermore, information in CBT environments can present many subtle 
dangers. For instance, even if all market participants knew a certain event 
has not occurred, market prices and quantities would still not be able to 
completely discount the event, for while everyone knows the event has not 
occurred, it may not be “commonly known” that the event has not occurred in 
the sense that there can still be participants who do not know that others 
know that the event has not occurred. It can be argued that technology has 
removed, to a certain extent, common knowledge from markets. Markets 
have become networked distributed computing environments (and a well-
known theorem states that events cannot be common knowledge in 
distributed computer environments due to the absence of concurrent 
centrality of observation, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the 
“electronic mail game”)27. This has in effect introduced large amounts of 
complexity, if only due to the fact that the outcome of the market now 
depends in a non-trivial way on what each trader believes any other trader 
believes about yet any other traders' beliefs about all other traders, and so 
forth. The direct link between market outcomes and the fundamental events 
that ought to act as anchors for valuation has been severed and replaced by 
a complex web of iterated and nested beliefs.  
 
                                            
27 See: Rubinstein, A. (1989). The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under almost common knowledge. 
American Economic Review, 79:385–391; and Halpern, J. & Moses, Y. (1990). Knowledge and common 
knowledge in a distributed environment. Communications of the ACM, 37(3):549–587. 
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 3.3 Socio-technical factors: normalisation of deviance  
Cliff and Northrop propose in DR4 that the “Flash Crash” event in the US 
financial markets on 6 May 2010 is in fact an instance of what is known 
technically as “normal failure”, and they explain that such failures have 
previously been identified in other complex engineered systems. They argue 
that major systemic failures in the financial markets, at a national or global 
scale, can be expected in future, unless appropriate steps are taken.  
Normal failures (a phrase coined in 1984 by Charles Perrow28) in engineered 
systems are major system-level failures that become almost certain as the 
complexity and interconnectedness of the system increases. Previous 
examples of normal failure include the accident that crippled the Apollo 13 
moon mission, the nuclear-power accidents at Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl, and the losses of the two US space-shuttles, Challenger and 
Columbia. 
As Cliff and Northrop note in DR4, the American sociologist Diane Vaughan 
has produced detailed analyses of the process that gave rise to the normal-
failure losses of Challenger and Columbia, and has argued that the key 
factor is the natural human tendency to engage in a process that she 
named29 “normalisation of deviance”: when some deviant event occurs that 
was previously thought to be highly likely to lead to a disastrous failure, if it 
then happens that actually no disaster does occur, there is a tendency to 
revise the agreed opinion on the danger posed by the deviant event, 
assuming that in fact it is normal: the “deviance” becomes “normalised”. In 
essence, the fact that no disaster has yet occurred is taken as evidence that 
no disaster is likely if the same circumstances occur again in future. This line 
of reasoning is only broken when a disaster does occur, confirming the 
original assessment of the threat posed by the deviant event.  
Cliff and Northrop argue that the Flash Crash was, at least in part, a result of 
normalisation of deviance. For many years, long before 6 May 2010, 
concerns about systemic effects of rapid increases in the price volatility of 
various instruments had led several UK exchanges to implement “circuit 
breaker” rules, requiring that trading in a security be suspended for some 
period of time if the price of that security moved by more than some 
percentage within a sufficiently short time-period. In response to the Flash 
Crash, the USA’s SEC has now enforced similar mechanisms in the US 
markets with the aim of preventing such an event re-occurring. Thus, it 
seems plausible to argue that before the Flash Crash occurred there had 
been a significant degree of normalisation of deviance: high-speed changes 
in the prices of equities had been observed, market participants were well 
                                            
28 Perrow, C. (1984). Normal Accidents: Living with High‐Risk Technologies. New York: Basic Books. 
29 Vaughan, D. (1997), The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA. 
University of Chicago Press. 
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 aware that that could lead to a high speed crash, but these warning signals 
were ignored and the introduction of safety measures that could have 
prevented them was resisted. 
Moreover, it could plausibly be argued that normalisation of deviance has 
continued to take place in the markets since the Flash Crash. There are 
anecdotal stories (summarised in DR4) that the speed of price fluctuations 
occurring within the limits of circuit breaker thresholds seems to be 
increasing in some markets; and there is evidence to suggest that another 
flash crash was “dodged” on 1 September 2010, in a similarly bizarre period 
when quote volumes exceeded even those seen at peak activity on 6 May 
2010, but no official investigation was commissioned to understand that 
latter event. Furthermore, the circuit-breaker mechanisms in each of the 
world’s major trading hubs are not harmonised, exposing arbitrage 
opportunities for exploiting differences; computer and telecommunications 
systems can still fail, or be sabotaged by enemies of the system, and the 
systemic effects of those failures may not have been fully thought through.  
Of course, the next Flash Crash will not be exactly the same as the last one, 
the SEC’s new circuit breakers will probably see to that. But there are no 
guarantees that another event, just as unprecedented, just as severe, and 
just as fast (or faster) than the Flash Crash cannot happen in future. 
Normalisation of deviance can be a very deep-running, pernicious process. 
After Challenger, NASA addressed the immediate cause (failure of a seal on 
the booster rockets), and believed the Shuttle to be safe. That was no help 
to the crew of Columbia.  
Reassurances from regulators are likely to sound somewhat hollow for as 
long as people can remember the near-total failure of the regulatory bodies 
to have anything useful to say about the subprime crisis until shortly after its 
severity was clear to even the most casual of observers. Light-touch 
regulation and its consequence for financial markets in the UK were 
discussed in the 2009 Turner Review30. Relatedly, the contributions of the 
Basel II regulations to the causes of the subprime crisis have been 
discussed in Shin (2010). The next market failure may well be a failure of 
risky technology that, like the Flash Crash, has no clear precedent. 
Cliff and Northrop argue in DR4 that normalisation of deviance poses a 
threat to stability in the technology-enabled global financial markets, and that 
the dangers posed by normalisation of deviance and normal failures are if 
anything heightened in the financial markets because the globally 
interconnected network of human and computer traders is what is known in 
the academic literature as a socio-technical system-of-systems (i.e., an 
interconnected mesh of people and adaptive computer systems interacting 
with one another, where the global system is composed of constituent 
entities that are themselves entire independent systems, with no single 
overall management or coordination). Such systems are so radically different 
                                            
30 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf  
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 from traditional engineered systems that there is very little established 
science or engineering teaching that allows us to understand how to manage 
and control such super-systems. This issue of normalisation of deviance in 
the financial markets and its role in informing the discussion of possible 
regulatory options was recently discussed in more detail by Haldane 
(2011)31.  
4. How can CBT affect financial stability in future?  
Left to its own devices, the extent of CBT may still grow, and the 
endogenous risk factors outlined above continue to apply. The mix between 
the three mechanisms however may have started to find its level. For 
instance, there are natural bounds on the extent of trading that can be 
generated by proprietary (“short-termist”) HFTs. First, those trades that have 
such HFTs on both sides of a transaction can generate profits only for one. 
Secondly, the no-trade theorem32 would predict that once it becomes known 
that the only trades put on are those by short-termist proprietary traders who 
do not have an incentive to hold the securities for fundamental reasons, 
trade will collapse. And lastly, much of the profits and rents of HFTs are 
competed away under increasing competition. Recent reports suggest that 
profits of HFT companies have turned downwards33, and a recent academic 
study34 has established that the total profits available for extraction by HFT 
may not be as large as some people suspect. Looking at trading patterns, 
there is preliminary evidence that HFT may have reached its equilibrium 
penetration into London and EuroNext equity trading (see DR5). In a 
nutshell, CBT may gain market share as more buy-side investors use it, but 
proprietary intermediation trading is naturally limited by the fundamental 
trading volume of real-money investors. 
If CBT further imposes itself while open-outcry trading pits (where human 
traders interact in close proximity to each other) and other centralised 
mechanisms vanish, then the disappearance of common knowledge and the 
creation of complex belief networks will progress further. On the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange for instance, some contracts moved from open-outcry 
to a hybrid model with open-outcry during waking hours and electronic 
markets outside of those hours. Over the next five to 10 years, one may see 
further substitution of floor based trading in favour of CBT, rendering all the 
effects described above more salient still. 
                                            
31 Haldane, A.S. (2011). The Race to Zero. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech509.pdf. 
32 Milgrom, P. and Stokey, N. (1982). Information, trade and common knowledge. J. Economic Theory, 26:17–
27. 
33 See, e.g., Cave, T. (2011): http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010‐10‐18/high‐frequency‐party‐over.  
34 Kearns, M., Kulesza, A., & Nevmyvaka, Y (2011). Empirical Limitations of High Frequency Trading Profitability. 
The Journal of Trading, 5(4):50‐62. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678758.  
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 Financial institutions optimise, subject to the regulatory environment, which 
means that constraints will often be binding and may influence market 
dynamics in unexpected and often detrimental ways. For instance, the 
academic literature has identified many circumstances where the “fallacy of 
composition” appears: the market system is unstable despite the fact that 
each algorithm in isolation is stable.35 This strongly suggests that if a testing 
facility for algorithms was introduced, individual safety is not a sufficient or 
indeed even a necessary criterion for systemic stability. It follows that in 
order to predict the future of CBT and financial stability one needs to make 
assumptions as to the future regulatory and other constraints imposed upon 
markets and think the new dynamics through carefully. For instance, further 
in-depth studies may provide indications as to how minimum resting times or 
minimum tick sizes affect nonlinear market dynamics and financial stability.  
A second institutional feature that will matter to future stability is the market 
segmentation between the various competing trading venues. Aligning 
valuations for single securities, baskets of securities, and derivatives across 
venues is a socially useful task that HFTs currently perform for a fee. Social 
welfare requires that this role be filled in a permanent and well-capitalised 
fashion. There is a small risk that HFTs, under situations of market stress, 
margin calls or collateral pressure, will not be able or willing to perform this 
job.  
Non-linearities in liquidity provision (leading to quick reversals between feast 
and famine) are an important root cause of system-wide non-linear dynamics 
that deserve further study. Most of the time HFT adds to liquidity, but some 
of the time (in periods of stress or crisis) it subtracts liquidity, causing price 
discontinuities. These liquidity non-linearities have probably become more 
acute in a HFT world because of the effects discussed above, which have 
made the “market makers problem” of inventory and information 
management not only different but also altogether more difficult.  
Finally, in closing, in a world with multiple trading and pricing venues that are 
interconnected by HFTs, the network topology determines the stability and 
the flow of information and trades. With the predicted proliferation of 
company-owned “dark pools”, the aggregate liquidity across all venues may 
well be larger than with single monopolised exchanges, but the dynamic 
behaviour of liquidity will depend more and more on the network structure as 
well as on the specifics of the HFTs which link the trading venues. A liquidity 
shock on one venue that might have gone unnoticed if there was one large 
centralised exchange can now affect prices on that venue. In normal times, 
the aberrant price would quickly disappear as cross-trading-venue HFTs buy 
low and sell high. But in stressed times, the capital of HFTs may be limited, 
or the HFTs themselves may start to doubt the prices (as happened during 
the Flash Crash) and refrain from arbitraging. Real-money investors then 
start to mistrust valuations across the board, and the resulting pressures 
mean that HFTs no longer contribute to liquidity provision, which makes 
                                            
35 This fallacy is discussed in Samuelson, P. (1947). Foundations of Economic Analysis, Harvard University Press. 
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 price divergence across trading venues worse still. And so the shock is 
transmitted through the network, and its effects are reinforced by positive 
feedback, as illustrated in Figure 8. Trades and transactions will happen at 
socially inefficient prices, and mark-to-market valuations can only be done to 
multiple and illiquid marks. Understanding how to avoid such situations, and 
to contain them when they do occur, is a topic for further research. 
 
Figure 8: Systemic Divergence Feedback Loop 
5. Conclusion 
Markets with significant proportions of computer based high frequency 
traders are a recent phenomenon. One of the most novel aspects of their 
dynamics is that interactions take place at a pace where human intervention 
could not prevent them, and in that sense an important speed limit has been 
breached. Because of the speed advantages that computers can offer in 
comparison to humans, computer based trading is now almost obligatory. 
This gives rise to the potential for new system-wide phenomena and 
uncertainties. One key issue is that information asymmetries become more 
acute (and indeed different in nature) than in the past; and the primary 
source of liquidity provision has changed, to computer based and high-
frequency trading systems, which has implications for the robustness of 
markets in times of stress. 
Research thus far provides no direct evidence that high frequency computer 
based trading has increased volatility. But, in certain specific circumstances, 
self-reinforcing feedback loops within well-intentioned management and 
control processes can amplify internal risks and lead to undesired 
interactions and outcomes. These feedback loops can involve risk-
management systems, and can be driven by changes in market volume or 
volatility, by market news, and by delays in distributing reference data. A 
second cause of market instability is social: normalisation of deviance, a 
process recognised as a major threat in the engineering of safety-critical 
systems such aeroplanes and spacecraft, can also affect the engineering of 
computer based trading systems.  
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 Key findings 
Overall, liquidity has improved, transaction costs are lower, and market 
efficiency has not been harmed by computerised trading in regular market 
conditions. 
The nature of market making has changed, shifting from designated 
providers to opportunistic traders. High frequency traders now provide the 
bulk of liquidity, but their use of limited capital combined with ultra-fast speed 
creates the potential for periodic illiquidity. 
Computer –driven portfolio rebalancing and deterministic algorithms create 
predictability in order flows. This allows greater market efficiency, but also 
new forms of market manipulation. 
Technological advances in extracting news will generate more demand for 
high frequency trading, while increased participation in this will limit its 
profitability. 
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 Executive summary 
Computerised trading has become the norm in markets, affecting everything 
from portfolio selection to order submission to market making to clearing and 
settlement. New players such as high frequency traders (HFT) and new 
strategies employing algorithmic trading (AT) are influencing the behaviour 
and quality of markets. With estimates of HFT participation rates in 
European equity markets of 30-50% and in US equity markets as high as 
70%, HFT has a profound influence on current markets. 
A natural concern is how such computerised trading is affecting the quality of 
markets. Market quality is usually expressed in terms of liquidity, transaction 
costs, and price efficiency. This study provides evidence on these effects in 
current markets and discusses the likely future impacts of computerised 
trading on market quality. 
The evidence suggests that computerised trading (whether in the guise of 
high frequency trading or algorithmic trading) has generally improved market 
quality. Liquidity, as measured by bid/ask spreads and other metrics, has 
improved over the last decade. During this period, transaction costs have 
also fallen for both retail and institutional traders. These liquidity and 
transaction cost effects have been particularly pronounced for large stocks. 
There is also evidence that market prices are more efficient, consistent with 
the hypothesis that computerised trading links markets and thereby 
facilitates price discovery. 
While overall liquidity has improved, there appears to be greater potential for 
periodic illiquidity. The nature of market making has changed, with high 
frequency traders now providing the bulk of such activity in both futures and 
equities. Unlike traditional designated specialists, high frequency traders 
typically operate with little capital, hold small inventory positions, and have 
no obligations to provide liquidity during periods of market stress. The speed 
of trading as well as the interconnectedness of markets made possible by 
HFT can transmit disruptions almost instantaneously across markets. The 
US Flash Crash, as well as more recent smaller illiquidity events, illustrates 
this increased potential for periodic illiquidity. 
The predictability of order flows arising from mutual fund rebalancing and 
deterministic trading algorithms creates potential disruptions to market 
quality. New forms of manipulation, such as algorithms programmed to take 
advantage of other algorithms, can raise trading costs and move prices away 
from efficient levels. Increasing competition in the high frequency space 
should limit such effects, as would new regulations. 
While there is some evidence that HFT decreased in early 2011, it has re-
emerged with the recent volatility in the market. HFT and algorithmic trading 
will remain important going forward as increased technological advances 
provide profitable opportunities to trade on computerised news analysis (NA) 
- 26 - 
 
 techniques. New regulatory changes may limit the profitability of HFT in the 
future. 
1. Introduction  
Technology has transformed asset markets, affecting the trading process 
from the point of asset selection all the way through to the clearing and 
processing of trades. Portfolio managers now use computerised order 
management systems to track positions and determine their desired trades, 
and then turn to computerised execution management systems to send their 
orders to venues far and wide. Computer algorithms (AT), programmed to 
meet particular trading desires, slice and dice orders to trade both temporally 
across the trading day and spatially across markets. High frequency traders 
(HFT) use ultra-fast computers and market linkages both to make and take 
liquidity across and between markets. Transaction cost analysis, using 
computers to capture price movements in and across markets, then allows 
asset managers to calculate their trade-specific transaction costs for 
particular trading strategies, and predict their costs from using alternative 
strategies.  
What is particularly striking is that virtually all of these innovations have 
occurred within the past 10 years.36 In this short interval the market ecology 
has changed, with markets evolving from traditional exchange-based 
monopolies to networks of computer-linked venues.37 Yet, while the process 
of trading in markets has changed, the function of markets remains the 
same: markets provide liquidity and price discovery that facilitates the 
allocation of capital and the management of risk. The purpose of this paper 
is to highlight what is known, and unknown, about the impact of computer 
trading on liquidity, transaction costs and market efficiency. The likely future 
evolution of computer trading on these dimensions of market quality is also 
considered. 
2. The impact of computer trading on liquidity, 
transaction costs, and price efficiency 
Determining the impact of technology on market quality (the general term 
used to describe the liquidity, transaction cost, and price efficiency of a 
market) is complicated by the many ways in which computers affect the 
trading process. Moreover, there is not even complete agreement on how to 
define some of these technological innovations. High frequency trading is a 
case in point. HFT was virtually unknown five years ago, yet high frequency 
traders at times participate in 70% or more of trades in equities and futures 
markets. The U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2010 
                                            
36 See DR5 for discussion of the origins and growth of computerised trading. 
37 See DR6 for discussion. 
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 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure (SEC (2010)) describes HFT 
as employing technology and algorithms to capitalise on very short-lived 
information gleaned from publicly available data using sophisticated 
statistical, econometric, machine learning, and other quantitative techniques. 
Yet, even within this general description, the SEC notes the difficulty in 
characterising what high frequency trading actually means: 
“The term is relatively new and is not yet clearly defined. It typically is used 
to refer to professional traders acting in a proprietary capacity that engage in 
strategies that generate a large number of trades on a daily basis… Other 
characteristics often attributed to proprietary firms engaged in HFT are: (1) 
the use of extraordinarily high-speed and sophisticated computer programs 
for generating, routing, and executing orders; (2) use of co-location services 
and individual data feeds offered by exchanges and others to minimize 
network and other types of latencies; (3) very short time-frames for 
establishing and liquidating positions; (4) the submission of numerous orders 
that are cancelled shortly after submission; and (5) ending the trading day in 
as close to a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying significant, 
unhedged positions over-night).”38 
Despite the lack of clarity as to the exact meaning of HFT, there is little 
disagreement as to its importance in markets. Many high frequency traders 
act as market makers by placing passive limit orders onto electronic order 
books.39 These passive orders provide the counter-party for traders wishing 
to find a buyer or seller in the market. In addition, high frequency traders 
often engage in statistical arbitrage, using their knowledge of correlations 
between and within markets to buy an asset trading at a low price and 
simultaneously sell a correlated asset trading at a higher price. This activity 
essentially “moves” liquidity between markets, providing a new dimension to 
the market making function. The centrality of this role means that HFT are 
involved in a large percentage of market volume. Estimates of HFT 
involvement in US equity trading are as high as 77%, with estimates of HFT 
involvement in European equities markets ranging from 30-50%. Estimates 
of HFT in futures and FX markets are in a similar range. Tabb Securities 
estimates profits of high frequency traders in 2010 at $7.2 billion, although 
Kearns, Kulesza, and Nevmyvaka (2010) argue that the actual number is 
much lower.40 
There are some important differences between such high frequency market 
making and its traditional specialist-based counterpart. HF market makers 
rely on high speed computer linkages (often achieved by co-locating their 
                                            
38 See Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010, Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Release No. 34‐
61458; File No. S7‐02‐10, page 45. 
39 See Brogaard (DR10) and Hendershott (DR12). 
40 M. Kearns, A. Kulesza, and Y. Nevmyvaka, 2010, Empirical Limitations of High Frequency Profitability, 
Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
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 computers at the exchange) to enter massive numbers of trades with the 
goal of earning the bid-ask spread. Such traders generally hold positions for 
very short periods of time (in some cases, micro-seconds) and some operate 
with very low levels of capital. Whereas, in traditional markets, specialists 
had obligations to stand ready to buy and sell, HF market makers trade 
opportunistically: they typically do not hold large inventory positions and they 
manage their risks by curtailing trading when market conditions are too 
adverse.41 This behaviour raises the spectre of periodic illiquidity. 
The debate surrounding high frequency trading has become increasingly 
heated, reflecting the varied perspectives on the ability (and desirability) of 
high frequency traders to move faster (and on the basis of potentially greater 
information) than other traders.42 Paul Krugman represents the contrarian 
view of high frequency trading:  
“It's hard to imagine a better illustration (of social uselessness) than high-
frequency trading. The stock market is supposed to allocate capital to its 
most productive uses, for example by helping companies with good ideas 
raise money. But it's hard to see how traders who place their orders one-
thirtieth of a second faster than anyone else do anything to improve that 
social function... we've become a society in which the big bucks go to bad 
actors, a society that lavishly rewards those that make us poorer.”43  
Rhetoric aside, while the issues surrounding computer based trading, and 
HFT in particular, are complex, they are amenable to economic analysis. A 
useful starting point is to consider how market quality has fared as this new 
market ecology has developed.44  
                                            
41 It should be noted that traditional specialists also typically avoided holding large inventory positions. The 
number of specialists obliged to make markets, meanwhile, has dwindled in the face of new competition. On 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) there are official market makers for many securities (but not for shares in the 
largest and most heavily traded companies, which instead use an automated system called TradElect). Some of 
the LSE's member firms take on the obligation of always making a two‐way price in each of the stocks in which 
they make markets. Their prices are the ones displayed on the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation (SEAQ) 
system and it is they who generally deal with brokers buying or selling stock on behalf of clients. 
42 High frequency traders generally use proprietary data feeds to get information on the state of the market as 
quickly as possible. In the U.S., this means that such traders receive information before it is delivered over the 
consolidated tape, raising issues of fairness and potential harmful effects on the cost of capital (see SEC [2010] 
(op cit) for discussion). 
43 New York Times, August 2, 2009. 
44 The development of the innovations discussed here occurred largely in the past decade, a time period also 
characterised by a very large financial and banking crisis and now a sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, both 
Europe and the U.S. saw dramatic regulatory change in the guise of MiFID and Reg NMS, respectively. 
Consequently, care must be taken before ascribing all change in the market’s behavior to particular 
technological innovations. 
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 3. Past: what has been the impact of computer trading 
on market quality in recent years?  
3.1 Liquidity 
Liquidity is a fundamental property of a well-functioning market, and lack of 
liquidity is generally at the heart of many financial crises and disasters. 
Defining liquidity, however, is problematic. At its simplest level, a market is 
liquid if a trader can buy or sell without greatly affecting the price of the 
asset. This simple statement, however, begs a variety of questions. Does it 
matter how much a trader wants to trade? Doesn’t time, or how long it takes 
to execute a trade, also matter? Won’t liquidity depend in part on the trading 
strategy employed? Might not liquidity mean different things to different 
traders? 
Academics and market practitioners have developed a variety of approaches 
to measure liquidity. Academics argue that liquidity is best measured or 
defined by attributes such as tightness, resilience, and depth.45 Tightness is 
the difference between trade price and original price. Depth corresponds to 
the volume that can be traded at the current price level. Resilience refers to 
the speed with which the price returns to its original level after some 
(random) transactions. In practice, researchers and practitioners rely on a 
variety of measures to capture liquidity. These include bid-ask spreads 
(tightness), the number of orders resting on the order book (depth), and the 
price impact of trades (resilience). Transaction cost analytical models (TCA) 
use measures such as realised spreads and effective spreads to measure 
actual liquidity, and rates of trade and order book dynamics to forecast 
expected liquidity.  
In current markets, a common complaint is that liquidity is transient, meaning 
that orders are placed and cancelled within a very short time frame and so 
are not available to the average investor. The counterpoint to this argument 
is that algorithms now split large orders (the so-called “parent” order) into 
smaller “child” orders that are executed over time and location. Like the 
unseen parent order, these child orders are often not totally displayed to the 
market. So liquidity per se is more of a moving target, and traders seek it out 
using various computer-driven strategies. A variety of algorithms, such as 
Credit Suisse “Guerrilla”, Goldman Sachs “Stealth”, or ITGs “Dark”, are 
designed to find liquidity without revealing the trading intentions, or even the 
existence, of the order submitter. This dichotomy between the lit and dark 
markets adds another dimension to the challenge of finding and accessing 
liquidity in computer-driven markets. 
The main question of interest is whether computerised trading (either in the 
guise of algorithmic trading or high frequency activity more generally) is 
associated with a decrease or increase in liquidity during regular market 
                                            
45 See Kyle, A. P., 1985, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, Econometrica, 53, 1315‐1335, and O’Hara, M., 
1995, Market Microstructure Theory, (Blackwell, Oxford) for discussion. 
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 conditions. An equally important question relates to whether such trading 
exacerbates liquidity problems in situations of market stress.  
There are a variety of studies that try to identify computerised trading and its 
consequences on the order book and transactions. Hendershott, Jones, and 
Menkveld (2011) use the automation of the NYSE quote dissemination as an 
implicit experiment to measure the causal effect of algorithmic trading on 
liquidity.46 In 2003, the NYSE began to phase in the auto-quote system, 
which empowered computerised trading, initially for six large active stocks 
and then slowly over the next five months to all stocks on NYSE. They find 
that this change narrowed bid-ask spreads which they interpreted as more 
algorithmic trading improving liquidity and reducing adverse selection. Their 
evidence is strongest for large stocks. Chaboud et al. (2009) also report 
results on liquidity in the Electronic Broking Services (EBS) exchange rate 
market.47 They find that even though some algorithmic traders appear to 
restrict their activity in the minute following macroeconomic data releases, 
algorithmic traders increase their supply of liquidity over the hour following 
each release. 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2010) investigate order book data from NASDAQ 
during the trading months of October 2007 and June 2008.48 Looking at 500 
of the largest firms, they construct a measure of HFT activity by identifying 
"strategic runs," which are linked submissions, cancellations, and executions 
that are likely to be parts of a dynamic strategy. Their conclusion is that 
increased low-latency activity improves traditional market quality measures 
such as spreads and displayed depth in the limit order book, as well as 
reduces short-term volatility. 
Brogaard (2010) also investigates the effect of high frequency trading on 
market quality.49 He finds that HFTs participate in 77% of all trades and that 
they tend to engage in a price-reversal strategy. He finds no evidence to 
suggest that HFTs withdraw from markets in bad times or engage in 
abnormal front-running of large non-HFT trades. HFTs demand liquidity for 
50.4% of all trades and supply liquidity for 51.4% of all trades. HFTs also 
provide the best quotes approximately 50% of the time. 
Turning to Europe, Menkveld (2011) studies in some detail the entry of a 
new high frequency trader into trading on Dutch stocks at Euronext and a 
                                            
46 Hendershott,T., C. Jones and A. Menkveld, 2011, Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity, Journal of 
Finance, 66, 1‐33. 
47 Chaboud, A., B. Chiquoine, E. Hjalmarsson, and C. Vega, 2009, Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic Trading in 
the Foreign Exchange Market, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 980, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
48 Hasbrouck, J. and G. Saar, 2010, Low Latency Trading, Working Paper, Cornell University. 
49 Brogaard, J. ,2010, High Frequency Trading and Its Impact on Market Quality, Working paper, Northwestern 
University. 
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 new market Chi-X in 2007 and 2008. He shows that the inventory of the high 
frequency trader ends the day close to zero but varies throughout the day, 
which is consistent with the SEC definition of HFT. He finds that the high 
frequency trader’s earnings all arise from passive orders (liquidity supply). 
He also finds that the bid-ask spreads were reduced by a factor of about 
30% within a year when comparing with Belgian stocks that were not traded 
by the HFT entrant.  
There are also studies reporting trends in liquidity without specifically linking 
it to AT/HFT. Castura et al. (2010) investigate trends in bid-ask spreads on 
the Russell 1000 and 2000 stocks over the period 2006 to 2010.50 They 
show that bid-ask spreads have declined over this period and that available 
liquidity (defined as the value available to buy and sell at the inside bid and 
ask) improved over time. Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2010) show a slow 
decrease in the average spread for S&P500 stocks over the period 2003-
2010 (subject to some short term up-side fluctuations in 2007/2008).51 They 
also find that depth has increased slowly over the relevant period. The 
evidence also shows that both the number of quotes per minute and the 
cancellation to execution ratio have increased, while market order execution 
speed has increased considerably. O’Hara and Ye (2011) examine liquidity 
issues in the context of how fragmentation has affected market quality.52 
They find that stocks with more fragmented trading had lower spreads and 
faster execution times. As HFT is more prevalent in the newer venues such 
as BATS and Chi-X, this evidence is suggestive that HFT is correlated with 
lower spreads and faster execution speeds.  
Two commissioned studies provide evidence for UK markets. Friederich and 
Payne (DR5) compare the operation of HFT in equities and FX. They find 
that penetration of algorithmic, dynamic agency flow (i.e. best execution of 
trades on behalf of clients) on multilateral order books in FX is small relative 
to equities, perhaps because FX is more liquid and therefore orders do not 
need to be broken up. They report no trend in volume (the traded value) of 
FTSE100 stocks traded between 2006 and 2011, but find that bid-ask 
spreads have decreased while depth has increased. The number of trades, 
on the other hand, has increased more than five times over this period, 
implying that the average trade size is now only 20% of its former level. For 
small UK stocks there are different results. First, the average trade size has 
not changed so much over the period 2006 to 2011, which suggests that 
HFT is not so actively involved in their trading. Second, there has been little 
improvement in the liquidity of small cap stocks. 
                                            
50 Castura, J., R. Litzenberger, R. Gorelick , and Y. Dwivedi , 2010, Market Efficiency and Microstructure 
Evolution in U.S. Equity Markets: A High‐Frequency Perspective, Working paper, RGM Advisors, LLC. 
51 Angel, J., L. Harris, and C. Spatt, 2010, Equity Trading in the 21st Century, SSRN. 
52 O’Hara, M., and M. Ye, 2011, Is Market Fragmentation Harming Market Quality? , Journal of Financial 
Economics, 100, 459‐474. 
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 Linton (DR1) measures the daily liquidity of the FTSE-All Share index using 
a low frequency measure, the absolute return to unit of volume. He finds this 
measure of liquidity has varied considerably over the last ten years, first 
declining and then rising during the financial crisis and then falling again. 
The same is true of traded volume. The process driving traded volume of UK 
equities seems to be highly persistent, which means that bad shocks to 
volume, like that which occurred in 2008/2009, can take a long time to 
correct. The main conclusion from this is that "Events" are driving the 
liquidity of UK equity markets, and that if HFT has a role to play in this trend 
it is relatively small and insignificant in comparison with the big picture of 
sovereign debt. 
In summary, most evidence points to improvement in liquidity in financial 
markets as a result of computerised trading and HFT, but that there may be 
some issues in times of market stress.  
3.2 Transaction costs 
Trading with computers is cheaper than trading with humans, so transaction 
costs have fallen steadily in recent years as a result of the automation of 
markets. Jones (2002) reports the average relative one-way costs paid for 
trading Dow Jones stocks between 1935 and 2000.53 He finds the total cost 
of trading has fallen dramatically in the period 1975- 2000. Angel et al. 
(2010) show that average retail commissions in the USA have decreased 
between 2003 and 2010, a period more relevant for inferring the effects of 
computer trading. They also make a cross country comparison of trading 
costs as of the end of 2009. According to this study, the United States large 
capitalisation stocks are the cheapest to trade in the world with a roughly 40 
basis point cost. Incidentally, the UK fared quite poorly in this comparison, 
with an average 90 basis point cost that was worse than the rest of Europe 
and Canada and only marginally better than emerging economy stocks. 
Menkveld (DR16) argues that new entry, often designed to accommodate 
HFT, had profound effects on transaction costs. For example, the entry of 
Chi-X into the market for Dutch index stocks had an immediate and 
substantial effect on trading fees for investors, first through the lower fees 
that Chi-X charged and then through the consequent reduction in fees that 
Euronext offered. The strongest effect however was a reduction in clearing 
fees. A new clearing house entered, EMCF, and this triggered a price war 
that ended up with a 50% reduction in clearing fees. 
In summary, the evidence is that transaction costs have declined in the last 
decade, mostly due to changes in the trading market structure (which is 
related closely to the development in HFT). 
                                            
53 Jones, C., 2002, A Century of Stock Market Liquidity and Trading Costs, Working paper, SSRN. 
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 3.3 Price efficiency 
A central claim of financial economists is that more efficient prices (better 
reflecting fundamental values) in financial markets contribute to more 
informed financing and investment decisions and ultimately to better 
allocation of resources in the wider economy. The usual way of measuring 
efficiency is through the predictability of prices based on certain information. 
In practice, widely-used measures such as variance ratios and 
autocorrelation coefficients estimate the predictability of prices based on 
linear rules. 
Several studies in this research project address the question of whether the 
strategies employed by HFT are likely to improve or worsen price efficiency. 
Brogaard (DR10) describes how high frequency traders (HFT) make money 
and how their activities may affect price discovery, for example by making 
the prices of assets with similar payoffs move more closely together. The 
profits of HFT come from a variety of sources including passive market 
making activity, liquidity rebates given by exchanges to reward supplying 
liquidity, and statistical pattern detection used in so-call “stat-arb” strategies. 
Greater market making activity should improve efficiency. HFT strategies 
that enforce the law of one price across assets and across trading venues 
similarly improve the quality of prices facing investors.54 Farmer (DR6) 
cautions that as market ecologies change, the transition to greater efficiency 
may be slow.  
Negative effects on efficiency can arise if HF traders pursue market 
manipulation strategies. Strategies such as front running, quote stuffing 
(placing and then immediately cancelling orders), and layering (using hidden 
orders on one side and visible orders on the other) can be used to 
manipulate prices. For example, deterministic algorithmic trading such as 
VWAP (volume weighted average price) strategies can be front-run by other 
algorithms programmed to recognise such trading. Momentum ignition 
strategies, which essentially induce algorithms to compete with other 
algorithms, can push prices away from fundamental values. However, it is 
clear that price efficiency-reducing strategies like manipulative directional 
strategies are more difficult to implement effectively if there are many firms 
following the same strategies. Thus, the more competitive the HFT industry, 
the more efficient will be the markets in which they work. 
There is a variety of evidence suggesting that price efficiency has generally 
improved in the presence of computer trading. Castura et al. (2010) 
investigate trends in market efficiency in Russell 1000/2000 stocks over the 
period 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2009.55 Based on evidence from 
variance ratios, they argue that markets become more efficient in the 
                                            
54 Hendershott (DR12) describes the meaning of price efficiency in the context of high speed markets, and 
presents the arguments why HFT may improve market efficiency by enabling price discovery through 
information dissemination.  
55 Castura el al (2010), op cit. 
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 presence of and increasing penetration by HFT. Brogaard (2010) provides 
further evidence on this question. He estimates that the 26 HFT firms in his 
sample earn approximately $3 billion in profits annually. Were HFTs not part 
of the market, he estimates a trade of 100 shares would result in a price 
movement of $.013 more than it currently does, while a trade of 1,000 
shares would cause the price to move an additional $.056. He also shows 
that HFT trades and quotes contribute more to price discovery than do non-
HFT activity. 
Linton (DR1) provides evidence based on daily UK equity data 
(FTSEAllshare). Specifically, he computes variance ratio tests and measures 
of linear predictability for each year from 2000-2010. The measures of 
predictability (inefficiency) fluctuate around zero with sometimes more and 
sometimes less statistical significance. During the financial crisis there was 
more pronounced inefficiency, but that has since declined. He finds no trend 
in efficiency in the UK market, whether good or bad. 
In summary, the preponderance of evidence suggests that HFT has not 
harmed, and may have improved, price efficiency. 
4. Present: what has been the impact of computer 
trading on market quality at present?  
The Flash Crash in US markets has brought increased scrutiny to the role of 
episodic illiquidity in markets and its relation to the current computer based 
market structure. The events of 6 May 2010 have now been extensively 
documented in two reports by the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission) and SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) staff. These 
reports show that a complex interaction of forces led to the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average falling 998 points, the largest intra-day drop in US market 
history. While the Flash Crash lasted less than 30 minutes, for a brief interval 
more than $1 trillion in market capitalisation was lost. In the aftermath of the 
crash, more than 20,000 trades were cancelled. A more lasting effect has 
been an almost continual withdrawal from equity investing by retail traders. 
The CFTC-SEC reports highlight the role played by a large algorithmic sell 
trade in the S&P e-mini futures contract that coincided with the beginning of 
the crash. While clearly an important factor, the reports also highlight the 
roles played by a variety of factors such as routing rules, quoting 
conventions, internalises (the name given to banks and broker/dealer firms 
that clear order flow internally), high frequency traders, and trading halts. 
These reports make clear two compelling facts about the current market 
structure: episodic illiquidity can arise, and when it does, it is rapidly 
transmitted to correlated markets. That the Flash Crash began in what is 
generally viewed as one of the most liquid futures contracts in the world only 
underscores the potential fragility of the current market structure. 
A variety of research considers how computer trading may be a factor in 
precipitating periodic illiquidity. Leland (DR9) highlights the role that forced 
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 selling can have on market liquidity. Such selling can arise from various 
trading strategies, and its effects are exacerbated by leverage. Leland 
argues that algorithmic trading strategies are triggered in response to 
automatic data feeds and so have the potential to lead to cascades in market 
prices as selling triggers price moves that trigger additional selling. Leland 
also argues that due to forced selling the crash of 19 October 1987 and the 
Flash Crash have great similarities. As modern HFT did not exist in 1987, 
this result underscores that market illiquidity is not a new event. What 
matters for our inquiry is whether current computer-driven practices are 
causing greater illiquidity risk. Madhavan (2011) argues that fragmentation 
linked to high frequency trading may be one such cause.56 He shows that 
fragmentation measured using quote changes, which he argues is reflective 
of high frequency activity, has high explanatory power with respect to cross-
sectional effects on equity instruments in the Flash Crash.  
Kirilenko et al. (2011) provide a detailed analysis of high frequency futures 
traders during the Flash Crash.57 They found that high frequency traders 
initially acted as liquidity providers but that as prices crashed some HFT 
withdrew from the market while others turned into liquidity demanders. They 
conclude that high frequency traders did not trigger the Flash Crash but their 
responses to unusually large selling pressure increased market volatility. 
Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2011) argue that historically high 
levels of order toxicity forced market makers to withdraw during the Flash 
Crash. Order flow is considered toxic when it adversely selects market 
makers who are unaware that they are providing liquidity at their own loss. 
Easley et al. (2011) develop a metric to measure such toxicity and argue that 
order flow was becoming increasingly toxic in the hours leading up to the 
Flash Crash.58  
There have been a variety of other, smaller illiquidity events in markets since 
the Flash Crash. On 8June 2011, for example, natural gas futures 
plummeted 8.1% and then bounced back seconds later. On 2 February 
2011, an errant algorithm in oil futures sent 2000-3000 orders in a single 
second, causing an 8 times spike in volatility and moving the oil price $1 
before the algorithm was shut down. In March, trades in 10 new Morningstar 
ETFs (exchange traded funds) were cancelled when prices fell by as much 
as 98% following what was determined to be a fat-finger problem (the 
colloquial name given to an input error entering data).  
                                            
56
 See Madhavan, A., 2011, “Exchange‐Traded Funds, Market Structure, and the Flash Crash”, Working paper, 
BlackRock. 
57
See Kirilenko, A., A. S. Kyle, M. Samadi, and T. Tuzun, 2011, The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency 
Trading on an Electronic Market, SSRN. 
58 See Easley, D., M. Lopez de Prado, and M. O’Hara, 2011, The Microstructure of the Flash Crash: Flow Toxicity, 
Liquidity Crashes and the Probability of Informed Trading, Journal of Portfolio Management, 37, 118‐128. 
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 In summary, the evidence suggests that high frequency trading and 
algorithmic trading may be contributing to periodic illiquidity in current 
markets.  
5. Future: how is the impact of computer trading on 
liquidity likely to evolve in the next 10 years?  
There is considerable uncertainty regarding the future role of high frequency 
trading. Tabb Group estimates that HFT accounted for 53% of trading in U.S. 
markets in the first half of 2011, a decrease from the 61% share it held in 
2010. However, the extreme market volatility in August 2011 saw HFT return 
with a vengeance. Wedbush, one of the largest providers of clearing 
services to high frequency firms, estimates that high frequency trading made 
up 75% or more of U.S. volume during the August 4 to 10 period.59 Whether 
HFT will continue to be as dominant when volatility subsides to normal levels 
remains to be seen. 
There are also indications that the profitability of HFT is reaching its limits 
and in the next ten years may come under further pressure.60 Such 
reductions may arise for a variety of reasons: the potential move to sub-
penny pricing in the U.S. may reduce profitability from market making; new 
types of multi-venue limit orders may be permitted that will reduce the 
potential for stale prices across different trading venues; new entrants to the 
HFT industry will take profits from incumbents; and, regulation and taxation 
may totally destroy their business model. Lowering costs of entry, which may 
arise from future technological improvements, can also improve competition. 
Limiting the value of small improvements in speed by, for example, reducing 
the value of time priority or requiring a minimum quote life, may also reduce 
HFT, because it will reduce the incentives for a winner take all speed race 
Nonetheless, it seems inevitable that computer trading will remain a 
dominant force in markets over the next 10 years. One reason for this will be 
technological advances that facilitate the automated extraction, aggregation, 
and filtering of news.61 Such news analytics (NA) could be used in model 
construction for high frequency traders as well as for portfolio managers. NA 
technologies currently allow for the electronic “tagging” of news events, 
corporate filings, and the like, allowing traders with access to this computer 
technology the ability to see more information faster. Tying such information 
into computerised trading strategies provides a means for traders to 
capitalise on information before it is imputed into market prices. HFT will be 
well positioned to take advantage of such nascent technology. 
                                            
59 See Mehta, N., “High Frequency Firms Tripled Trades Amid Rout, Wedbush Says”, Bloomberg, August 12, 
2011. 
60 See Brogaard (DR10) and Hendershott (DR12). 
61 See Mitra, diBartolomeo, Banerjee, and Yu (DR8). 
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 To the extent such trading puts information into prices more rapidly, markets 
will benefit by becoming more efficient. However, such strategies also serve 
to increase the “arms race” in markets by bestowing greater rewards on the 
most technologically savvy traders. Consequently, it may be that all trading 
evolves toward computer trading, reflecting that technology diffuses across 
populations given time.  
As this happens, market systems may experience unwanted negative 
effects.62 One such effect is already present in the problems of message 
traffic. Message traffic is the name given to computer instructions to place, 
change, and cancel orders. On any trading day, message traffic far exceeds 
trading volume, as far more orders are cancelled or changed than are ever 
executed. On volatile days, message traffic can cause market outages due 
to the inability of servers and other computer components of trading to 
handle the flow. Such outages were widespread during the Flash Crash of 
May 2010. They recurred in early August 2011, when the extreme volume 
and volatility took out trading platforms at Goldman Sachs and other large 
trading firms in the US. When this occurs, market liquidity is affected. 
A related systematic risk can arise if a large sub-set of market participants 
are following the same strategies. For example, if News Analytics (NA) 
becomes a driving force in portfolio management, then sequences of sell (or 
buy) orders may arrive at the market, all driven by the same information. For 
market makers, such orders are “toxic”, because the market maker will be 
acting as counterparty to agents with better information. As seen in the Flash 
Crash, when toxicity overwhelms market makers their strategy is to 
withdraw, and illiquidity results. Consequently, new risk management 
products will need to evolve to allow market makers, traders, and regulators 
alike the ability to function.63 The future of computer trading may thus involve 
more technology capable of controlling the technology controlling the 
markets. 
6. Conclusions  
Computer trading is now the reality in asset markets. Technology has 
allowed new participants to enter, new trading methods to arise, and even 
new market structures to evolve. Much of what has transpired in markets is 
for the good: liquidity has been enhanced, transactions costs have been 
lowered, and market efficiency appears to be better, or certainly no worse. 
But there are issues with respect to periodic illiquidity, new forms of 
manipulation, and potential threats to market stability due to errant 
algorithms or excessive message traffic that must be addressed. Regulatory 
changes in practices and policies will be needed to catch up to the new 
                                            
62 See Farmer and Skouras (DR6). 
63 See, for example, Easley, D., M. Lopez de Prado, and M. O’Hara, 2011, The Exchange of Flow Toxicity, Journal 
of Trading, 6, 8‐13. 
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 realities of trading in asset markets. Caution must be taken to avoid undoing 
the very many advantages that the high frequency world has brought. 
Technology will continue to affect asset markets in the future, particularly as 
it relates to the ultra-fast processing of news into asset prices. 
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 Paper 3: The impact of technology 
developments 
Dave Cliff, University of Bristol.  
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 Key findings 
Ongoing advances in the sophistication of ’robot‘ automated trading 
technology, and reductions in the cost of that technology, are set to continue 
for the foreseeable future. 
Today’s markets involve human traders interacting with large numbers of 
robot trading systems, yet there is very little scientific understanding of how 
such markets can behave.  
For time-critical aspects of automated trading, readily customisable, special-
purpose silicon chips offer major increases in speed; where time is less of an 
issue, remotely-accessed ’cloud‘ computing services, offer even greater 
reductions in cost.  
Future trading robots will be able to adapt and learn with little human 
involvement in their design. Far fewer human traders will be needed in the 
major financial markets of the future.  
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 Executive Summary 
The speed and sophistication of computer and communications technology 
in the financial markets, as elsewhere, is increasing rapidly, while the real 
cost of the technology is continually falling. There are jobs in the markets 
that have always been the responsibility of human workers but which can 
now be done by machines doing the same work for less cost, with fewer 
errors, and much faster. Moreover, present-day ’robot‘ computer trading 
systems are capable of performing jobs that no human trader could ever do, 
such as assimilating and integrating vast quantities of data and making 
multiple accurate trading decisions on split-second time-scales. Current 
technology developments are also providing more sophisticated news 
analytics techniques. Modern trading systems can learn not only from news, 
but also from their own experience in the markets. High frequency trading 
(HFT) is deeply reliant on such technologies. 
It is clear that both the pace of development of technology innovations in the 
financial markets, and the speed of their adoption, look set to continue or 
increase in the future. Computing power will get cheaper; automated trading 
systems will get faster, and more intelligent. The availability of cheap ‘cloud’ 
computing power means that computers can readily be used to evaluate vast 
numbers of alternative designs for trading strategies, selecting the best 
designs and further refining them. The final designs can be implemented not 
as programmes running on conventional computers, but rather as special-
purpose, customised silicon chips, for extra speed. Computer-designed and 
computer-optimised robot traders are likely to be increasingly viewed as 
routine, and in time could potentially come to replace current algorithms 
designed and refined by humans. Future cloud computing services could 
provide automated compilation down to customised silicon-chip hardware. 
Already, a very large proportion of transactions in the markets are computer-
generated, yet large numbers of human traders remain in the markets. In 
several significant markets (such as foreign exchange) the overall number of 
human traders engaged in on-the-spot execution of orders has fallen sharply 
in recent years, and is likely to continue to reduce in the future. 
Nevertheless, the present-day mix of human and robot traders looks set to 
continue for some time. Given this mix of humans and robots, studying 
present-day markets lies neither wholly within the realms of social sciences 
such as economics, nor wholly within the realm of computer and 
communications systems engineering. Rather, the current markets are 
manifestly socio-technical systems. The characteristics and dynamics of 
markets populated by mixtures of humans and robots are not at all well 
understood, and they sometimes behave in unpredictable, undesirable ways. 
Even fully automated trading systems, with ‘robot traders’ provided by many 
different parties, need very careful study. The primary challenges for the 
future are centred on how the complex dynamical socio-technical ecosystem 
of the global financial markets can be mapped, managed, and modified to 
prevent undesirable behaviour1. 
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 These technology developments mean that major trading systems can today 
exist anywhere. Emerging economies may capitalise on the opportunities 
made available by new technologies and thereby may come to threaten the 
long-established historical dominance of major European and US cities as 
global hubs for trading in the financial markets.  
1: Introduction  
The present-day move to ever higher degrees of automation on the trading 
floors of exchanges, banks, and fund-management companies is similar to 
the major shift to automated production and assembly that manufacturing 
engineering underwent in advanced economies during the 1980s and 1990s, 
and is likely to have a similar effect on the distribution of employment in the 
financial sector. Already, a very large proportion of transactions in the 
markets are computer-generated and yet the characteristics and dynamics of 
markets populated by mixtures of human traders and machine traders are 
not at all well understood, and sometimes the markets behave in 
unpredictable, undesirable ways. Few details are known of the connectivity 
network of interactions and dependencies in technology-enabled financial 
markets. There is a clear need to map the current global financial network, to 
gain an understanding of the current situation. Such a mapping will enable 
the development of new tools and techniques for managing the financial 
network, and to explore how it can be modified to reduce or prevent 
undesirable behaviour.64 It is clear that new technology, new science and 
engineering tools and techniques, will be required to help map, manage, and 
modify the market systems of the future.  
2: How has financial market technology evolved?  
The technology changes of the past five years are best understood as a 
continuation of longer-term trends. Cliff, Brown, and Treleaven (DR3) relate 
the history of technology in the financial markets, covering the 18th, 19th, 
and 20th centuries in brief and then explore in more detail the rapid and 
significant changes which have occurred in the opening years of the 21st 
century. Their narrative is summarised here, which draws on many 
sources.65 
                                            
64 The need to map, manage, and modify the financial network is the central message from a 2009 speech 
Rethinking the Financial Network by A. Haldane, the Bank of England’s Executive Director responsible for 
Financial Stability: see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf. 
65 For other accounts of the recent history of technology developments in the financial markets, the 
following three texts are particularly recommended: J. Angel, L. Harris, & C. Spratt (2010), Trading in 
the 21
st
 Century. (Unpublished manuscript, available from http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-
10/s70210-54.pdf); P. Gomber, et al. (2011). High Frequency Trading. Technical Report, Goethe 
Universität & Deutsche Börse; and D. Leinweber (2009), Nerds on Wall Street. John Wiley Publishers. 
For a very recent discussion of high-frequency trading, including interviews with leading practitioners, 
see E. Perez (2011), The Speed Traders. McGraw-Hill Publishers.  
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 As Cliff et al. discuss in DR3, the high-speed processing of data, and high-
speed communication of data from one location to another, have always 
been significant priorities for the financial markets. Long before the invention 
of computers or pocket-calculators, traders with fast mental arithmetic skills 
could out-smart their slower-witted competitors. In the 19th Century, 
communication of financially significant information by horse-riding 
messengers was replaced by the faster ‘technology’ of carrier pigeons; then 
pigeons were made redundant by telegraph; and then telegraph by 
telephones. In the last quarter of the 20th century, the shift to computer-
based trading systems meant that automated trading systems could start to 
perform functions previously done only by humans: computers could monitor 
the price of a financial instrument (a share-price, say) and could issue orders 
to buy or sell the instrument if its price rose above or below specified ’trigger‘ 
prices. Such very simple ’program trading‘ systems were widely blamed for 
the Black Monday crash of October 1987, the memory of which for several 
years afterwards dampened enthusiasm for allowing computers to issue buy 
or sell orders in the markets. Nevertheless, the real cost of computer power 
continued to halve roughly once every two years (the so-called ‘Moore’s 
Law’ effect), and so by the late 1990s it was possible to buy, at no extra cost, 
computers roughly 100 times more powerful than those used in 1987. All this 
extra computer-power could be put to use in implementing much more 
sophisticated processing for making investment decisions, and for issuing 
structured patterns of orders to the markets.  
By the turn of the millennium, as the real cost of computing continued to fall 
at dramatic pace, the management of investment funds had become an 
increasingly technical field, heavily dependent on computationally intensive 
mathematical models to reduce or offset portfolio risk, i.e. to ‘hedge’ the risk 
in the fund’s holdings, giving rise to the phrase ‘hedge fund’. Many hedge 
funds based their investment decisions on so-called statistical arbitrage 
(commonly abbreviated to ‘stat arb’). One popular class of stat arb strategies 
identify long-term statistical relationships between different financial 
instruments, and trade on the assumption that any deviations from those 
long-term relationships are temporary aberrations, that the relationship 
would revert to its mean in due course. One of the simplest such ‘mean-
reversion’ strategies is pairs trading, where the statistical relationship which 
is used as a trading signal is the degree of correlation between just two 
securities. Identifying productive pair-wise correlations in the sea of financial-
market data is a computationally demanding task, but as the price of 
computer-power fell, so it became possible to attempt ever more 
sophisticated stat arb strategies.  
At much the same time, the availability of cheaper computation meant that it 
was possible to deploy automated trading systems that had considerably 
more intelligence than those implicated in the 1987 crash. In most cases, 
this intelligence was based on rigorous mathematical approaches that were 
firmly grounded in statistical modelling and probability theory. The new wave 
of automated systems concentrated on execution of a trade. The computer 
did not make the decision to buy or to sell a particular block of shares or 
quantity of commodity, nor to convert a particular amount of one currency 
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 into another: those decisions were still taken by humans (possibly on the 
basis of complex statistical analysis). But, once the trading decision had 
been made, the execution of that trade was then handed over to an 
automated execution system (AES). Initially, the motivation for passing 
trades to an AES was that the human traders were then freed up for dealing 
with more complicated trades. As AES became more commonplace, and 
more trusted, various trading institutions started to experiment with more 
sophisticated approaches to automated execution: different methods, 
different algorithms, could be deployed to fit the constraints of different 
classes of transaction, under differing market circumstances; and hence the 
notion of ‘algorithmic trading’ was born.  
At the same time as AES systems were being developed to reduce market 
impact, other trading teams were perfecting advanced stat arb techniques for 
identifying trading opportunities based on complex statistical regularities 
which lay deep in the data: the price and volume data for hundreds or 
thousands of instruments might have to be considered simultaneously and 
cross-compared, in the search for opportunities similar to the pairs trading of 
the 1980’s, but typically involving very many more than two instruments. 
These advanced stat arb approaches were made possible by powerful 
computers used to run the statistical analyses, and also by developments in 
computer-based trading infrastructure (the machinery which traders use to 
communicate with each other and with the exchanges). Two notable 
developments were Straight-Through Processing (STP), where the entire 
trading process from initiation of an order to final payments and clearing is 
one seamless electronic flow of transaction-processing steps with no human-
operated intermediate stages; and Direct Market Access (DMA), where 
investors and investment funds are given direct access to the electronic 
order-books of an exchange, rather than having to interact with the market 
via an intermediary such as an investment bank or broker/dealer.  
The convergence of cheap computer-power, statistically sophisticated and 
computationally intensive trading strategies, fast automated execution via 
STP, and DMA, means that in the last two or three years it has become 
commonplace for market participants to seek counterparties to a transaction 
electronically, identify a counterparty, and then execute the transaction, all 
within a small number of seconds.  
The old “vertically integrated” business model of investment banking is 
becoming increasingly fragmented. One effect of the EU’s MiFID legislation 
was to create an ecosystem of small and medium-sized businesses offering 
‘middleware’ technology components that could each be purchased and then 
plugged together to achieve the same functionality which had previously 
been the exclusive preserve of the trading systems developed in-house by 
big institutions. This lowered the barriers to entry: armed with enough cash, 
one or two entrepreneurs working in a rented office with a high-speed 
internet connection can set up a trading company and automate much, or 
perhaps all, of the workflow required to run a fund. At the same time, a new 
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 style of trading has emerged, known as high-frequency trading (HFT),66 
where automated systems buy and sell on electronic exchange venues, 
sometimes holding a particular position for only a few seconds or less. That 
is, an HFT system might ‘go long’ by buying a quantity of shares (or some 
other financial instrument, such as a commodity or a currency) hold it for 
perhaps two or three seconds, and then sell it on to a buyer. If the price of 
the instrument rises in those two or three seconds, and so long as the 
transaction costs are small enough, then the HFT system has made a profit 
on the sale. The profit from holding a long position for three seconds is 
unlikely to be great, and it may only be a couple of pennies, but if the HFT 
system is entirely automated, then it is a machine that can create a steady 
stream of pennies per second, of dollars per hour, twenty four hours per day. 
A recent study by Kearns et al. (2011)67 indicates that the total amount of 
money extractable from the markets via HFT may be more modest than 
some might estimate or guess: a few tens of billions of dollars in the US 
markets. Despite this, the low variation in positive returns (the ‘steady’ in 
‘steady stream of pennies’) from a well-tuned HFT system is an attractive 
feature, and one that makes HFT an area of intense interest in the current 
markets.  
As the global financial markets became dependent on computers running 
automated trading systems and communicating with each other over optical 
fibre networks, the speeds of computation and of communication became 
two primary means by which competitive advantage could be gained and 
maintained. The effect of this in the present-day markets is discussed in the 
next section.  
3: What are the key current technology developments?  
Firms at the front line of the financial markets, such as investment banks, 
fund management companies, and exchange operators, are all critically 
dependent on information technology (IT) and the telecommunications 
networks that allows computers to talk to each other. For the past two 
decades, nearly all such firms used their own in-house IT systems, very 
often involving powerful ’server‘ computers connected to ’client‘ computers 
running on the desks of each employee. Almost always, the client computers 
would be standard personal computers (PCs), of the sort available from 
high-street retailers; and the server computers would actually be constructed 
from several very high-specification PC computers, all located together and 
                                            
66 Google Trends (trends.google.com) indicates that Google’s users, worldwide, have only used the phrase “high 
frequency trading” as a search term in the past three years, and “algorithmic trading” only in the past five years. 
67 M. Kearns, A. Kulesza, & Y. Nevmyvaka (2010). Empirical Limitations on High Frequency Trading 
Profitability. The Journal of Trading, 5(4):50-62. Available from 
http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~mkearns/papers/hft_arxiv.pdf.  
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 connected to each other in a single room; that room being the firm’s ’server 
room‘, or ’data centre‘.  
As Cliff, Brown, and Trelevean (DR3) describe in some detail, the global IT 
industry is currently undergoing a major shift, toward ‘cloud computing‘ 
where ultra-large-scale data-centres (truly vast warehouses full of 
interconnected computers) are accessed remotely as a service via the 
internet, with the user of the remotely-accessed computers paying rental 
costs by the minute or by the hour. This greatly lowers the cost of high-
performance computing (HPC), and hence reduces barriers to entry for 
individuals or firms looking to use supercomputer-scale HPC for the 
automated design and optimisation of trading systems: rather than spend 
millions of dollars of capital expenditure on an in-house HPC data-centre 
facility, it is now possible to get the same results from a few thousand dollars 
of renting HPC from cloud-computing providers. That is, it is no longer 
necessary to have the financial resources of a major hedge fund or 
investment bank to engage in development of highly technology-dependent 
approaches to trading. The full implications of this are not yet clear.  
At the same time, the desire for ultra-high-speed processing of financial data 
has led a number of market leaders to abandon the use of general-purpose 
computers such as commercially available PCs, and replace them instead 
with customised special-purpose silicon chips. Some of these silicon chips 
have hundreds or thousands of independent small computers on them, each 
operating in parallel, giving huge increases in speed. This is discussed in 
more depth by Cliff et al. (DR3), which includes discussion of financial 
companies which have already made this move, concluding that the switch 
to such ‘custom silicon’ is set to continue in the coming decade.  
These two trends mean that greater computational power and greater speed 
are becoming more readily available per unit cost, and so technologists have 
turned their attention to developing innovative new systems for automated 
generation of trading decisions and/or automated execution of the orders 
necessary to enact those decisions.  
One major new technology that is currently the focus of significant research 
and development is the prospect of computers being programmed to 
‘understand’ not only the numeric information of market prices, volumes, and 
times, but also the non-numeric ‘semantic’ information that is carried in 
human-readable data-streams such as written news reports; audio data such 
as telephone calls, radio shows, podcasts,and video sequences. This is an 
issue explored in depth by Mitra et al., whose work is summarised in Section 
3.1.  
Despite the increases in computer power, processing speed, and 
sophistication of computer algorithms, the present-day financial markets still 
involve large numbers of human traders. There are good reasons for 
expecting that for the next decade or so the number of humans participants 
in the market will remain significant. For most major markets in the US, UK, 
and mainland Europe, the proportion of computer-generated trades is 
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 estimated to be variously 30%, 50%, and in some cases nearer 75%68. What 
is clear then, is that the current markets involve large numbers of human 
traders interacting with large numbers of automated trading systems. This is 
a major shift in the make-up of the markets, and may well have affected the 
dynamics of the markets, (see Chapters 1 and 2). Research that explores 
the interactions of humans and algorithmic trading systems is discussed in 
Section 3.2.  
3.1 Automated analysis of market news and sentiment 
Mitra et al. (DR8) commence the core of their report with a consideration of 
which asset classes are best suited to automated trading by computers. 
They contend that different financial instruments have different liquidity and 
that the optimal trading frequency for an instrument can be expressed as a 
function of the liquidity of its market, amongst other factors. The higher the 
optimal trading frequency, the more useful algorithmic trading is. The traders 
in a market can be classified as one of two types: those who aim to profit by 
merely providing liquidity (so-called ‘inventory traders’); and those who 
instead aim to profit by trading on the basis of information. Inventory traders 
act as ‘market-makers’: they hold a sufficiently large quantity of an 
instrument (their inventory) that they are always able to service buy or sell 
requests, and they make money by setting a higher price for selling than for 
buying (this is the type of business model that is familiar from any airport 
foreign-exchange retail outlet). Inventory traders can, in principle, operate 
profitably without recourse to any information external to the market in which 
their instruments are being traded. The second class of traders, known as 
‘informed’ or ‘value-motivated’ traders, make use of information in news 
stories and related discussion and analysis to come to a view about what 
price an instrument should be trading at either now or in the future, and then 
buy or sell that instrument if their personal opinion on the price is different 
from the current market value. In recent years, technologies have been 
developed that allow computers to analyse news stories and discussions on 
social networking websites, and they are rapidly increasing in sophistication.  
Mitra et al. argue that the primary asset classes suitable for automated 
trading are equities, including exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and index 
futures, foreign exchange, and to a lesser extent commodities, and fixed 
income instruments. ETFs are securities traded on major exchanges as if 
they were standard stock equities (shares in a company), but the ETF 
instead represents a share in a holding of assets such as commodities, 
currency, or stock. As would be expected, news events (both anticipated and 
unanticipated) can affect both traditional manual trading for these asset 
classes and also automated trading activities. Anticipated events are those 
such as the release of official inflation data by government treasury 
                                            
68 See, e.g.: I. Kaminska (2011), Algo trading and the Nymex, Financial Times Alphaville Blog, 
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/03/04/505021/algo-trading-and-the-nymex/, and I. Kaminska (2009), HFT in 
Europe, Financial Times Alphaville Blog, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/07/24/63651/high-frequency-trading-in-
europe/.  
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 departments or scheduled earnings announcements by firms; unanticipated 
events are those such as news concerning major accidents, terrorist actions, 
or Act-of-God natural disasters. Because of the effect that news events can 
have on the prices of financial instruments, major global companies exist to 
provide news feeds specific to the financial markets, including Thompson 
Reuters, The Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones 
Newswire and Bloomberg. Much of the news content comes in formats that 
can readily be processed by computers. The content from traditional mass-
market news broadcasters, such as the BBC, can also be processed by 
computers (possibly after some automated re-formatting, or conversion from 
audio/video to text-based transcripts). 
Because of this, researchers in academia and in financial institutions have 
developed methods for news analytics. Significant advances have been 
made in recent years, and the techniques are still growing in sophistication. 
In general, it is reasonable to predict that a computer will be able to react to 
a breaking news story faster than a human can, but of course this is only 
useful if its analysis of the story is actually correct. Some practitioners argue 
that automated trading and news analytics puts manual (human-based) 
trading at a considerable disadvantage; and that this applies to both retail 
investors and institutional investors. Although the current state of the art in 
leading-edge news analytics technology can not yet reliably outperform a 
well-informed human trader reading the same material, and has only very 
limited abilities in comparison to the human capacity for reasoning and 
lateral thinking, the capabilities and sophistication of news analytics systems 
will continue to increase over the next decade, possibly to the point where 
they surpass the performance of human analysts and traders.  
3.2 Studying interactions between human and algorithmic trading 
systems 
The global financial markets are now populated by two types of economic 
agent: human traders, and ‘software agents’. The latter are either algorithmic 
systems performing trading jobs that ten or 20 years ago would have been 
the responsibility of humans, or HFT systems doing jobs that no human 
could ever hope to attempt. Interactions between human traders in electronic 
markets has long been studied in the field known as Experimental 
Economics, and more recently the interactions between software-agent 
traders in electronic markets has been the topic of various research studies 
in so-called Agent-based Computational Economics. Curiously, these two 
research fields are largely distinct: the first studies markets populated 
entirely by human traders while the second studies markets populated 
entirely by algorithmic software-agent traders. There is a surprisingly stark 
lack of studies of the interactions between human traders and algorithmic 
trading systems. That is, there is really very little scientific literature that 
explores heterogeneous markets, populated by both humans and algorithmic 
systems. De Luca et al. (DR 13) surveyed the surprisingly small amount of 
published peer-reviewed literature which does describe scientific studies of 
interactions between human and algorithmic traders.  
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 The first paper to report any such results was published in 200169 by a team 
of researchers working at IBM, where two trading algorithms were each 
demonstrated to outperform human traders. IBM’s work served as an 
inspiration to Prof. Jens Grossklags of the University of California at 
Berkeley, who used similar methods to explore different questions in papers 
published in 2003 and 200670. Until 2011, the experiments reported by IBM 
and by Grossklags were the only three peer-reviewed papers in the scientific 
literature that studied this topic. This is a startling ‘gap’ in the research 
literature which has only very recently started to be filled. The most recent 
papers in this field are two published by De Luca and Cliff in 201171, 
replicating and extending IBM’s experiments from 2001. 
In DR 13, De Luca et al. contend that the relative lack of such studies is a 
serious omission from the literature. They give a detailed description and 
analysis of results from several new experiments, conducted specifically for 
the Foresight driver review (DR13), where some of the artificial experimental 
constraints that were used in earlier work are relaxed, for greater realism 
and hence increased relevance to the real-world markets. The key 
conclusion from De Luca et al.’s review is that their new experiments 
indicate that the previously reported outperformance of the algorithmic 
trading systems over humans are probably a consequence of the artificial 
nature of the experimental designs in which they were evaluated, and may 
also be due simply to the fact that computers can act and react faster than 
humans. When the flow of orders in the market was trickled in gradually 
(rather than all orders being released simultaneously, which was an artificial 
constraint in the designs of the earlier experiments) the performance of the 
software agents relative to the humans was significantly diminished. De Luca 
et al.’s results in DR13 provide some empirical support for the intuitive notion 
that the primary advantage that current software-agent trading algorithms 
have over humans is the speed at which they operate, although being faster 
at trading does not necessarily lead to greater overall efficiency in the 
market. 
3.3 From the present to the future 
Some key issues in today’s markets look likely to continue to remain vitally 
important in the future. For instance, cyber-security will remain a core 
concern: electronic attacks on the computer systems and communications 
                                            
69 R Das, J. Hanson, J. Kephart, & G. Tesauro (2001). Agent-human interactions in the continuous 
double auction. In Proceedings of IJCAI-01, 
http://www.research.ibm.com/infoecon/paps/AgentHuman.pdf. 
70 J. Grossklags & C. Schmidt (2006). Software agents and market (in)efficiency: a human trader 
experiment. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part C (Applications and Reviews), 
36(1):56-67.  
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 networks of the global financial markets are always likely to be attractive to 
criminals. Furthermore, the widespread move toward higher reliance on 
advanced computing technology means that the speed of light is now a 
significant limiting factor in determining how trading systems interact with 
one another. Even with the best technology imaginable, information cannot 
be transmitted faster than the speed of light, and even at light-speed it does 
actually take measurable periods of time to move information across an 
ocean, or even across a few city blocks. This constraint is never going to go 
away. 
The evolution of classes of algorithms is discussed in detail by Gergely 
Gyurkó, in DR5. Recent academic research indicates that coming 
generations of trading algorithms will be adaptive (learning from their own 
experience) and will be the result of automated computerised design and 
optimisation processes. Therefore, the performance of next-generation 
trading algorithms may be extremely difficult to understand or explain, both 
at the level of an individual algorithm, and at the system-level of the market 
itself.  
4: Technology advances likely in the next 10 years  
As with many such competitive interactions, in the technology arms-race 
new innovations only confer competitive advantage to an innovator for as 
long as it takes the innovator’s competitors to copy that innovation or to 
come up with counter-innovations of their own: as soon as all traders are 
using a particular new technology, the playing field is levelled again. 
Nevertheless, several of the present-day technology trends seem likely to 
remain significant factors over the coming years.  
4.1 Cloud computing 
Cloud computing offers the possibility that it is no longer necessary to have 
the financial resources of a major hedge fund or investment bank to engage 
development of highly technology-dependent approaches to trading. 
Nevertheless, there are regulatory and legislative issues that need to be 
carefully examined: for example for jurisdictional reasons, the geographic 
location of the remote servers can matter greatly. Cloud-computing service 
providers are well aware of such concerns, and can offer geographic 
guarantees in their service-level agreements and contracts. Moreover, 
remote access of computing facilities, even at the speed of light, means that 
there will be latencies in accessing the remote systems. For very many 
applications, these may not matter, but for trading activities, the latencies 
inherent in communicating with remote data-centres can be prohibitive. 
Latency would certainly be a problem if an institution tried to run its 
automated HFT algorithms ‘in the cloud’, but it is important to remember that 
not all trading is HFT: there are other modes of trading, such as long-only 
macro trading, that are not so latency-sensitive. 
The primary impact of cloud computing on activities in the financial markets 
in the next ten years will not be in the provision of computing facilities that 
automate execution, but rather in the ability of the cloud to provide cheap, 
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 elastically scalable, high-performance computing (HPC). Such cheap, 
remote HPC will allow massively computer-intensive procedures to be 
deployed for the automated design and optimisation of trading strategies and 
execution algorithms: this computational process is not latency sensitive. 
Many major investment banks and hedge funds already own and operate 
their private data-centres, but they do this for business-critical operations 
and only a fraction of the capacity can be turned to HPC uses. The ability to 
either extend existing in-house computer power by adding on cloud-based 
resources (known as ‘cloudbursting’) or to simply outsource all of the HPC 
provisioning to a cloud provider, opens up new possibilities that are only just 
being explored.  
4.2 Custom silicon 
General-purpose, commercially available personal computers (PCs) have 
over recent years moved from being based on a single central processing 
unit (CPU) chip such as an Intel Pentium, to a new breed of CPU chips that 
have multiple independent computers (known as “cores”) built into them. 
Perusal of high-street stores will reveal PCs with dual-core and with quad-
core chips as standard. In rough terms, a dual-core chip can do twice as 
much work as a single-core chip per unit of time, and a quad-core can do 
four times as much. Currently there is a major shift underway toward so-
called many-core computing, exploring the speed-ups offered by using chips 
with many tens or hundreds of independent cores operating in parallel: often 
this involves using specialised processing chips originally designed for 
computer graphics processing. Furthermore, as was noted above, the desire 
for ultra-high-speed processing of financial data has led a number of market 
leaders to abandon the use of general-purpose computers such as 
commercially available PCs, and replace them with special-purpose silicon 
chips that can be customised or programmed ‘in the field’ (i.e., the end-user 
of the chip customises it to whatever purpose fits that user’s needs). 
Currently the most popular such technology is a type of chip known as a 
field-programmable gate array (FPGA). Currently, programming an FPGA is 
a very complicated and time-consuming task: the programmer has to 
translate an algorithm into the design for an electronic circuit and describe 
that design in a specialised hardware description language. Despite these 
complexities, the switch to such custom silicon is likely to continue over the 
next decade because of the speed gains that it offers. Over that period it is 
probable that the use of FPGAs will be supplanted by a newer approach to 
custom silicon production, involving more readily field-programmable multi-
core or many-core chips. Such chips will be programmable in a high-level 
software language much like current industry-standard programming 
languages. This means that conventionally-trained programmers can write 
algorithms that are then ‘compiled down’ onto the underlying silicon-chip 
hardware, without the need to learn specialised FPGA hardware description 
languages. This has the potential to reduce custom-silicon development 
times (currently measured in days or weeks) down to waits of only a few 
minutes from describing a trading algorithm in a high-level programming 
language, to having that algorithm running on a massively parallel high-
speed computing array composed of many independent customised silicon-
chip processing elements. In DR3, Cliff, Brown, and Treleaven claim that this 
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 style of computer hardware is likely to be in wide use within the next decade. 
This type of hardware would have enough computing power to enable future 
generations of trading algorithms that are adaptive (learning from their own 
experience) and that will not have been designed by human engineers, but 
rather will be the result of automated computerised design and optimisation 
processes.  
4.3 Computer-generated trading algorithms that adapt and learn 
The use of automated optimisation methods to design and improve 
autonomous adaptive trading algorithms is already commonplace in 
academic research, and its use in the finance industry looks set to increase 
over the next decade. This is a development that is enabled and accelerated 
by the step-change drop in cost of HPC offered by cloud computing service 
providers, and by the huge speed increases offered by custom silicon. 
Because these next-generation trading algorithms will have little or no 
human involvement in their design and refinement, the behaviour of any one 
such automated trader may be extremely difficult to understand or explain, 
and the dynamics of markets populated by such traders could be very 
difficult to predict or control. 
5: Conclusion 
It is reasonable to speculate that the number of human traders involved in 
the financial markets could fall dramatically over the next ten years. While 
unlikely, it is not impossible that human traders will simply no longer be 
required at all in some market roles. The simple fact is that we humans are 
made from hardware that is just too bandwidth-limited, and too slow, to 
compete with coming waves of computer technology.  
Just as real physical robots revolutionised manufacturing engineering, most 
notably in automobile production, in the latter years of the 20th Century, 
leading to major reductions in the number of employees required at car 
plants, so the early years of the 21st seem likely to be a period in which a 
similar revolution (involving software robot traders) occurs in the global 
financial markets. The number of front-line traders employed by major 
financial institutions is likely to fall, but there may be increased demand for 
developers of algorithms.  
On the basis of the evidence reviewed in the various papers discussed in 
this chapter, it is clear that both the pace of development of technology 
innovations in the financial markets, and the speed of their adoption, look set 
to continue or increase in the future. One stark implication of the 
developments reviewed here is highlighted in DR3: trading systems can 
today exist anywhere. Emerging economies such as those of Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China may capitalise on the opportunities available from the new 
technologies and in doing so may, within only a few decades, come to 
threaten the historical dominance of major European cities as global hubs for 
financial trading. Formulating appropriate policy responses to such potential 
threats is a matter for further consideration.  
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 Glossary of terms  
Volatility – variability of an asset’s price over time, often measured in 
percentage terms. 
Financial market stability – the lack of extreme movements in asset prices 
over short time periods.  
Liquidity – the ability to buy or sell an asset without greatly affecting its 
price. The more liquid the market, the less the price impact will be. 
Market making – providing liquidity to buyers and sellers by acting as a 
counterparty. A market maker buys from sellers and sells to buyers. 
Designated liquidity provider – a general term given to a market 
participant who agrees to stand ready to buy or sell an asset to 
accommodate market demand. 
Order book – the collected limit orders to buy or sell an asset. Order books 
today are generally electronic and allow traders to specify a price at which 
they would like to buy a specified quantity of an asset or a price at which 
they would like to sell a quantity of the asset. 
Order flows – the arrival of buy orders and sell orders to the market 
Market efficiency – concept that market prices reflect the true underlying 
value of the asset.  
Transaction costs – the costs trader incur to buy or sell an asset 
Market transparency – the ability to see market information. Post-trade 
transparency refers to the ability to see trade prices and quantities. Pre-trade 
transparency refers to the ability to see quotes.  
Price efficiency – when an asset’s price reflects the true underlying value of 
an asset.  
Price discovery – the market process whereby new information is 
impounded into asset prices.  
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